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Abstract
In the study of contemporary politics few interstate relationships have proven
more instrumental, controversial, and perplexing to global policy makers than that which
has persisted between Moscow and Tehran since the collapse of the USSR. Despite the
great importance of Russian-Iranian relations to questions of global and regional politics
there has, to date, been very little in the way of critical scholarship performed on the
subject. While a wide-array of accounts from subject analysts provide a wealth of data
on contemporary and historical events which have presumably defined and conditioned
bilateral relations, there has been relatively little effort to isolate, examine, test, and
evaluate those conditions or variables that are deemed salient to cooperation. In light of
these circumstances, this study seeks to initiate a tradition of scholarship on RussianIranian relations that appeals broadly to the use of a scientific methodology.
The first step of any scientific inquiry requires attention devoted expressly to the
development of a dependent variable of bilateral political affinity. While it remains
outside the scope of this present investigation to analyze the host of factors/conditions
capable of influencing bilateral relations, the formalization of a variable which records
changing political affinity is a necessary first step and one that will fill-in a significant
gap within the existing literary tradition.

Rather than simply dismissing the extant

tradition of literature on Russian-Iranian relations, this study seeks to aggregate and
transform the subject’s many diverse narratives into a user-friendly, quantitative, political
metric which can form the basis for future empirical inquiry. Thus this study introduces a

i

new approach to monitoring and measuring changes in Russian-Iranian cooperation
known as General Political Affinity (GPA).
Represented on the basis of a 21-point scaled indicator of bilateral affinity, GPA
succinctly defines cooperation between Moscow and Tehran as the summation of three
underlying, persistent issue dimensions: the trade in conventional weapons; cooperation
in Iranian nuclear development; and level of agreement on matters of Caspian Sea
delimitation.

In more generic terms, these three criteria seek to evaluate interstate

cooperation, generically, as a product of:

defense cooperation; state-sponsored

development assistance; and territorial agreement.

The unique approach to

operationalizing political affinity presented in this study not only functionally improves
our ability to explain and predict the course of Russian-Iranian relations, but also
provides a new schematic for evaluating bilateral relations among all political dyads.

ii
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Chapter I
Introduction
Introduction
In the study of contemporary politics few interstate relationships have proven
more instrumental, controversial, and perplexing to global policy makers than that which
has persisted between Moscow and Tehran since the collapse of the USSR. Alternating
between periods of intimate cooperation and serious diplomatic fatigue, the status of
Russian-Iranian relations at any given moment has captivated the attention of the world
community because of its demonstrated importance to global affairs. Moscow’s frequent
diplomatic support of Tehran alongside of its recurrent transfers of conventional
weaponry and nuclear technology have raised important concerns for regional and
western leaders who fear that the Islamic Republic’s coming of age will have
unprecedented consequences for the status quo of relations in the middle east. Although
Russian leaders have often sought to ease international concerns by making public
promises to both restrict and/or monitor the scale of its cooperation with Iran, perhaps
just as frequently the Kremlin has defaulted on these same commitments thereby causing
western leaders to question Moscow’s role in the global community. The duplicitous
nature of Russia’s policies towards Iran in the post-Cold War era have only further
obscured the answer to whether or not Moscow is, today, a supporter of the global and
regional status quo or whether it is, in fact, a dangerous revisionist power.
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Yet despite the great importance of Russian-Iranian relations to questions of
global and regional politics there has, to date, been very little in the way of critical
scholarship performed on the subject. While a wide-array of accounts from subject
analysts provide a wealth of data on contemporary and historical events which have
presumably defined and conditioned bilateral relations, there has been relatively little
effort to critically isolate, examine, test, and evaluate those conditions or variables that
are deemed salient to cooperation. If the question of Russian-Iranian relations is, in fact,
critical to global governance, then the method of addressing this relationship must also be
performed in a manner that is critical. In light of these circumstances, this study seeks to
initiate a tradition of scholarship on Russian-Iranian relations that appeals broadly to the
use of a scientific methodology.
The first step of any scientific inquiry will require attention devoted expressly to
the development of a dependent variable of bilateral political affinity. While it will
remain outside the scope of this present investigation to analyze the host of
factors/conditions capable of influencing bilateral relations, the formalization of a
variable which records changing political affinity is a necessary first step and one that
will fill-in a significant gap within the existing literary tradition.

Rather than simply

dismissing the extant tradition of literature on Russian-Iranian relations, this study seeks
to aggregate and transform the subject’s many diverse narratives into a user-friendly
political metric which can form the basis for future empirical inquiry. Thus this study
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introduces a new approach to monitoring and measuring changes in Russian-Iranian
cooperation known as General Political Affinity (GPA).
Represented on the basis of a 21-point scaled indicator of bilateral affinity, GPA
succinctly defines cooperation between Moscow and Tehran as the summation of three
underlying, persistent issue dimensions: the trade in conventional weapons; cooperation
in Iranian nuclear development; and level of agreement on matters of Caspian Sea
delimitation.

In more generic terms, these three criteria seek to evaluate interstate

cooperation, generically, as a product of:

defense cooperation; state-sponsored

development assistance; and territorial agreement.

The unique approach to

operationalizing political affinity presented in this study not only functionally improves
our ability to explain and predict the course of Russian-Iranian relations, but also
provides a new schematic for evaluating bilateral relations among all political dyads.
By redirecting the analysis of Russian-Iranian relations into the realm of science,
not only do we improve our ability to both explain and predict the course of relations
between these two important nations, but so too do we begin to initiate a professional and
more dynamic discussion. While the narrative efforts of so many analysts are indeed
informative, without a carefully defined forum, much valuable information may easily
become lost through a series of otherwise disparate monologues. In contrast, this study
intends to create those conditions favorable to stimulating a rigorous dialogue
surrounding one of the most important political relationships of the 21st century.

3

Progress of Study
No critical evaluation of Russian-Iranian relations can proceed without first
undertaking the necessary steps to creating a dependent variable of political affinity that
efficiently depicts the changing nature of cooperation during the period in question.
Despite the fact that there is much significant scholarship on the history of RussianIranian relations—the most significant of which is John W. Parker’s (2008) incredibly
rich account Persian Dreams—to my knowledge no one (including Parker) has thus far
attempted to create a quantifiable index of bilateral relations in the post-Soviet era. Thus
this study will be wholly dedicated to the process of constructing what I hereafter refer to
as a dependent variable of General Political Affinity or GPA.
Beginning in Chapter II, I provide a comprehensive investigation of RussianIranian bilateral relations between the years of 1987 and 2011. While the scope of this
study will focus predominantly upon the post-Soviet period, this chapter provides
additional historical information at the outset that is both relevant to my study and which
is also useful to the reader that is otherwise unfamiliar with general developments in
Soviet-Iranian relations prior to the late 1980s. Beginning with the year 1987 I proceed
to evaluate bilateral relations in discrete, five-year periods, narrowing the study’s focus
down to three substantive issue areas upon which I base my index of General Political
Affinity, these areas are:

the ongoing trade in conventional weapons; bilateral

cooperation in nuclear development; and the status of agreement between both nations
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over issues of Caspian Sea delimitation. In each succeeding five-year period, I highlight
the status of developments in each of these three areas.
While political cooperation may be gauged by any number of issues, the tradition
of literature surveyed during this study suggests that these issue areas form a reliable core
of political relations in the late-Soviet and post-Soviet periods. By training this chapter’s
focus upon three discrete areas of cooperation, I provide the amorphous concept of
political affinity with a defined structure which allows the reader to gauge the changing
scale of cooperation in a simplified and efficient manner.
Building upon the qualitative description of bilateral relations recounted in
Chapter II, Chapter III consists of the formal development of a quantitative indicator of
General Political Affinity. Taking the reader step-by-step through the formulation of
each of the three subcomponents of GPA (trade in conventional weapons, cooperation in
nuclear development, status of agreement on Caspian Sea delimitation), as well as the
construction of the scaled, composite 21-point indicator itself, this chapter presents a
model of Russian-Iranian cooperation that is intuitive, dynamic, unprecedented, and
which accurately represents the qualitative historical discussion presented in Chapter II.
Complementing the construction of this variable is a regime of testing in the final
sections of the chapter which attempts to confirm GPA’s utility for measuring bilateral
political affinity between Moscow and Tehran.

5

In Chapter IV, I conclude this study by reviewing the set of findings that are
pertinent to understanding Russian-Iranian relations, and close with a discussion of future
prospects for the empirical analysis of Russian-Iranian relations.

6

Chapter II
Developments in Russian and Iranian Bilateral Relations
Introduction
In this chapter, I review the history of Russian-Iranian relations in both the Soviet
and post-Soviet era analyzing the relationship in discrete five-year blocks for the period
1987—2011. While this chapter seeks to provide the unfamiliar reader with a rich
summary of bilateral historical relations, it simultaneously functions as a platform for the
development of a composite, dependent variable of General Political Affinity (GPA)
covering the post-Soviet era. As discussed previously, the composite variable of GPA
measures distinctly political relations between both the Russian Federation and the
Islamic Republic of Iran according to three substantive issue areas on a year-by-year
basis. The three areas of focus are: 1) defense relations—emphasizing the annual trade
in conventional weapons; 2) interstate development assistance—here treated as annual
Russian assistance in Iranian nuclear development; and 3) territorial agreement—
specifically referring to the annual status quo of agreement in post-Soviet delimitation of
the Caspian Sea.
While political affinity among nations has often been measured along a wide
variety of state-oriented dimensions including similarities of domestic political
institutions (Werner, 2000), security alliance portfolios (Tammen et al., 2000), and
foreign policy positions (Signorino & Ritter, 1999), there has also been a tendency within
the tradition to make use of economic data as a means of describing changes in the
7

quality of interstate relations across time. Without directly contradicting the proposition
that economic trends can elucidate meaningful information about bilateral or multilateral
political affinities, this study does determine to evaluate the quality of Russian-Iranian
relations on the basis of overtly political variables as a means of preserving the overall
clarity of such a notion as ‘political affinity.’ Thus, this study agrees with Bruce Bueno
de Mesquita, who has argued in The War Trap against the use of economic indicators to
measure political affinity writing, “economic relations represent a mixture of
governmental policy and the policies and interests of actors in the private sectors” (Bueno
de Mesquita, 1981, p. 110).
In the particular case of Russian-Iranian relations, reliance upon purely economic
data would tend to skew one’s perspective towards increasing bilateral cooperation across
time failing, in the process, to
acknowledge

the

significant

diplomatic challenges faced by
both nations throughout the entire
post-Soviet era (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Bilateral Exports between the USSR/Russian
Federation and Iran (1981-2011). Source: International
Monetary Fund, “Direction of Trade Statistics” database.

Creating

a

dependent

variable

which adequately hopes to measure

bilateral political affinity, therefore requires a variable (or series of variables) which is
capable of being highly sensitive to ongoing political debates, challenges, and
opportunities—a condition which economic indicators are simply less likely to fulfill.
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This study will also try to limit its reliance upon more traditional, yet often
generic, indicators of political affinity that focus narrowly upon a single issue-dimension
of bilateral relations.

As this chapter will demonstrate, although Russian-Iranian

relations can be measured across a variety of planes, certain issue-dimensions have been
of critical importance to both nations and, in fact, are unique to their bilateral
relationship. While traditional indicators such as state security alliance portfolios or
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting are perhaps appropriate to large-scale
studies involving numerous countries, such indicators fail to recognize the fact that each
set of interstate relationships tends to hinge upon its own unique set of variables.
Following the work of numerous scholars and analysts this study again suggests that
Russian-Iranian interstate relations can best be understood by focusing attention upon
three substantive issue areas: the sale of arms and military technology; cooperation in
development of the Iranian civilian nuclear program; and the status of agreement or nonagreement on Caspian Sea delimitation. Although this chapter will explore a variety of
factors comprising political cooperation, special attention will be paid in each sub-section
to these three issues which, in turn, shall form the basis of a composite dependent
variable of General Political Affinity. Chapter III will discuss the construction and
formalization of that variable.
While this study will concentrate its focus upon the post-communist era (1992present), a cursory review of relations during the Soviet era (1917-1991) will prove itself
invaluable to readers who are otherwise unfamiliar with the constantly shifting patterns of
9

cooperation and non-cooperation that have come to define the long-term association of
both capitals.

It has become relatively commonplace among analysts to insist that

relations between Moscow and Tehran have generally been troubled historically and that
periods of improved affinity were likely due to changing geo-strategic conditions which
merited some form of temporary cooperation (Parker, 2008, p. x-xi). Drawing upon a
series of territorial and diplomatic disagreements dating back to the 19th century, analysts
frequently suggest that the resting state of relations between Moscow and Tehran is more
often one of general non-cooperation fueled by many dour historical memories. Rather
than qualifying the general state of relations between Moscow and Tehran as one defined
by antagonism and non-cooperation, we might better understand the bilateral relationship
as one of constantly changing conditions, where periods of cooperation and noncooperation are predictably and continually inter-woven into one another.

Review of Relations during the Soviet Era (1917-1991): A geo-strategic alliance
Although relations between the Russian and Persian empires had been strained by
a series of treaties during the 19th century that had formally transferred control of Persian
territories in the North Caucasus to St. Petersburg (the 1813 Treaty of Gulistan & the
1828 Treaty of Turkmanchai) , at the outset of the 20th century the status of relations was
set to change (Parker, 2008, p. 1-2). The end to Tsarist rule in Russia and the rise of the
communists to power in 1917 precipitated new opportunities for inter-governmental
collaboration as the communist regime of the USSR sought to gain international political
10

allies that could help to alleviate the potential threat of a British military intervention
from the south as well as to deter British support for the anti-Bolshevik White army
(Mamedova, 2009, p. 2-3; Rubinstein, 1982, p. 52). As part of an effort designed to
protect the USSR from harmful implications of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, both
parties signed the first Soviet-Iranian Treaty in 1921(Mamedova, p. 2-3; Rubinstein, p.
60-1). According to N.M. Mamedova, the 1921 Treaty operated as a generous political
concession to the Persian monarchy. She indicates that under its terms the USSR not
only agreed to release the Persian monarchy from all previous debts owed to Tsarist
Russia, but also willfully divested itself of all Russian holdings in Iran including its claim
to islands in the Caspian Sea while simultaneously preserving the Persian navy’s right to
operate in the Caspian (Mamedova, p. 2). Despite these impressive concessions, the
USSR managed to preserve its own claim to territories in the North Caucasus as affirmed
by the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchai and gained important security assurances from
Tehran (Parker, 2008, p. 2). Under the 1921 Treaty, article 5 ensured that neither nation
could become a staging ground for hostile third-party operations against the other even
going so far under article 6 as to provide the USSR with a legal right to enter Iran if the
Persian regime was unable to guarantee compliance with article 5 (Mamedova, p. 3-4;
Parker, p. 2-3; Milani, 2007, p. 329; Rubinstein, p. 61). Thus within four years of the
October Revolution, relations between both capitals had turned a dramatic corner as the
USSR and Persia sought to overcome resentments associated with the former Tsarist era.
But a joint security commitment, debt forgiveness, and territorial agreement were not the
11

only hallmarks of this new-found cooperation, between 1921 and 1933 both capitals
would work together to forge a new, multi-faceted and highly productive economic
relationship.
The interwar years can be described in largely cooperative terms. In Iran the
regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi determined to make its newfound Soviet ally a critical
partner in a broad new economic development agenda (Rubinstein, 1982, p. 61-2). Under
this program both nations worked to create a variety of jointly managed enterprises
designed to facilitate the bilateral trade in essential goods (Mamedova, 2009, p. 4-5).
According to Mamedova during this period, the USSR became a primary export market
for Iranian goods while simultaneously working to aid Iran in the development and
regeneration of numerous export-oriented industries (p. 5). Citing a 1935 report by the
People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade, Mamedova indicates that the USSR had
“accounted for 35% of Iranian foreign trade…buying 100 percent of all Iranian exports of
fish and ambary, 97.5 percent of rice and cattle, 90 percent of cotton, 86 percent of wool,
68 percent of silkworm cocoons, [and] 47 percent of leather and hides” (p. 6). Perhaps the
most important product of these early joint efforts was the creation of Iran’s first railway
system which ran 900 miles and provided a critical linkage between both the Caspian Sea
and Persian Gulf (Rubinstein, p. 62). Although Mamedova indicates that each nation’s
move towards increasing levels of dictatorship was placing real limits on trade growth,
due to an overall downward pressure on the influx of private capital, it was not until the
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late 1930s that trade relations between both nations effectively collapsed (Mamedova, p.
6).
By Mamedova’s account, the collapse in trade relations that would occur by the
late 1930s was due to an emerging diplomatic row between Moscow and Tehran
following the USSR’s entrance into the League of Nations in 1934 (2009, p.6).
Mamedova indicates that following the USSR’s admission into the League, officials in
Tehran began to request that Moscow abandon its rights under article 6 of the 1921
Treaty (the article providing the USSR with a right of occupation) arguing that security
was effectively guaranteed to Moscow under the League of Nations charter, she writes:
However, the USSR refused to do so and this had an adverse effect on any further
development of relations between the two countries…After the expiration of validity of
the Treaty of 1935 [3 year validity], economic relations between the USSR and Iran
practically ceased, as the Iranian side refused to prolong the treaty (Mamedova, p. 6).
During the years of World War II, Soviet-Iranian relations faced increasing challenges as
leaders in Moscow became wary over Tehran’s diplomatic overtures towards Germany—
overtures made in spite of its otherwise stated position of neutrality (Rubinstein, 1982, p.
62). Having allowed German advisors into Iran, the USSR asserted that the Shah was
unable to guarantee a commitment to Soviet security as outlined under articles 5 and 6 of
the 1921 Treaty (Rubinstein, p. 62). On August 25, 1941 a combined Soviet and British
force entered Iran with the British occupying the south and the Soviets occupying Iran’s
Northern provinces (Rubinstein, p. 62).

Within six months Iran capitulated to the
13

demands of the Soviets and British and formally entered into a tripartite alliance that
would effectively transform Iran into a tactical and logistical partner to allied forces
(Rubinstein, p. 62). The treaty, signed in January of 1942, not only secured Iran’s
allegiance to allied forces but also contained set guidelines for the withdrawal of foreign
forces from Iran within six months of the conclusion of the conflict; while the British
would honor their agreement by March of 1946, the Soviet decision to delay its
withdrawal created more animosity between both capitals and left the Soviets firmly
entrenched in Iran until May of 1946 (Rubinstein, p. 63-4). By some accounts the Soviet
withdrawal could be credited to the influence of the United Nations Security Council
which had begun to intervene at Iran’s request in January of 1946, yet others suggest that
the order to withdraw was given only after the USSR had achieved significant political
concessions—one of which included the direct representation of the Soviet-backed Tudeh
party in Prime Minister Qavam as-Saltaneh’s cabinet (Rubinstein, p. 63-4).
Described as “the most powerful and best organized political party in Iran’s
modern history,” (Milani, 2007, p. 329) Tudeh’s direct ties to the USSR would be a
constant source of concern for successive Iranian regimes throughout the Cold War era.
A locally-rooted communist party, Tudeh, not only represented the interests of the USSR
in the Iranian parliament and cabinet during the late 1940s, but it also became a vital
platform for the USSR’s increasing support to ethnic separatist movements then being
organized in the northern provinces (including Iranian-Azerbaijan) (Rubinstein, 1982, p.
63-4). Iran’s suppression of these autonomous movements under the Shah in the early
14

1950s would become an increasing source of tension for both governments as the Shah’s
harsh public policy quickly swelled the number of immigrants to the USSR (Mamedova,
2009, p. 9). Perhaps most controversial of all, however, was Tudeh’s close relationship
to Prime Minister Mossadeq. This relationship had alarmed western nations to the
growing power of Soviet influence in Iran and had apparently been the motive force
behind the United States decision to support the Shah in Mossadeq’s ouster in 1953
(Rubinstein, p. 65-6).
Immediately following the coup, the Shah worked quickly to eliminate Soviet
influence in Iran by banning Tudeh’s participation in government and strategically
reorienting his nation towards the United States (Mamedova, 2009, p. 10; Milani, 2007,
p. 329; Rubinstein, 1982, p. 66). Iran’s subsequent decision to join the western-focused
Baghdad Pact/Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 as well as its formal
rejection of articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian—and the signing of a defense
treaty with the United States just two days later in March of 1959—would effectively
come to represent a complete breakdown in interstate political cooperation with the
USSR (Rubinstein, p. 68). And yet, as is common to relations between Moscow and
Tehran, a new era of renewed cooperation was predictably close at hand.
Between 1962 and 1963 Iran attempted to revitalize its diplomatic and economic
relations with Moscow; Iran’s efforts in these early years would lead to a renewed era of
cooperation that would last for more than a decade, collapsing only after the infamous
1979 Iranian revolution (Rubinstein, 1982, p. 73). In 1962, the Shah made formal
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guarantees to Moscow that Iran would not house missile bases of any foreign nations on
its soil, thereby demonstrating its new commitment to neutrality in the quickly polarizing
world-system of the Cold War era (Rubinstein, 68-9). This initial move reignited
relations and set off an important series of high profile diplomatic exchanges between
1962 and 1965 (Parker, 2008, p. 3-4; Mamedova, 2009, p. 9-10; Milani 2004, p. 329).
The Shah’s increasing interest in developing cooperative relations with Moscow
throughout the 1960s and 1970s is generally felt to be a reaction to the need for
increasing diplomatic and economic support in Iran at a time when the Pahlavi regime’s
survival had been put at increasing risk due to a wave of unpopular economic and land
reforms that had officially begun in 1963—what is generally referred to as the ‘White
Revolution;’ by increasing ties to the USSR, the Shah believed he could both compensate
for Washington’s demonstrated failure to become a substantive partner in Iranian
development and security while also staving off the likelihood of a Soviet-backed
counter-insurgency aimed at suppressing his program of land reform (Parker, 2008, p. 5;
Mamedova, 2009, p. 9; Rubinstein, 1982, p. 68, 73-4, 83). Rubinstein also indicates that
rapprochement with the USSR was made feasible at this time due to a series of
significant changes in U.S. policy within the region; specifically, he notes the fact that the
United States was then making large-scale strategic upgrades to its nuclear arsenal in the
region that would increase its deterrent capacity, while also simultaneously attempting to
improve diplomatic ties with the USSR (despite the Cuban Missile Crisis of October
1962) (Rubinstein, p. 69).
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Between 1962 and 1974 Iran and the USSR would engage in a series of high-level
diplomatic exchanges that produced many impressive results including: as much as $1
billion in low-interest Soviet loans; a swap of Soviet military equipment for Iranian
natural gas supplies; the introduction of new air-route agreements; long-term oil and gas
contracts; the joint construction of the Trans-Iranian gas pipeline and negotiations for a
second gas pipeline valued at $3 billion; the creation of more than 100 various, long-term
industrial development projects in such fields as metallurgy, oil and gas, petrochemicals,
power development (including the development of uranium), agriculture, and the
construction of related transportation infrastructure (Parker, 2008, p. 3-4; Mamedova,
2009, p. 9-10; Milani, 2007, p. 329; Rubinstein, 1982, p. 73, 76-7, 83-4). And while
cooperation would continue generally through 1978, significant challenges to cooperation
were increasing already by the mid-1970s.
One exception to this long-term expansion of cooperation was a notable dispute
beginning in January 1974 over natural gas pricing in which Iran sought to increase the
cost of gas exports to the USSR in accordance with the terms of a prior 1966 agreement
that had indexed the price of natural gas exports to the value of crude oil on world
markets (Rubinstein, 1982, p. 77-82). As oil prices rose in the wake of the Arab-Israeli
War of 1973, tensions between Tehran and Moscow also increased as the Kremlin
initially refused to accommodate Tehran’s requests (Rubinstein, p. 77-82). Following the
interruption of gas deliveries in July of that same year both nations quickly reached an
accommodation that ended the crisis (Rubinstein, p. 77-82).
17

Although overall

cooperation between both nations was not truly hindered by these developments, they do
provide a formal pretext for assessing both nations in the post-Soviet era as energy
competitors. While present restrictions on Iran’s development of natural gas supply
capability limit the experience of direct competition today, this early event clearly
demonstrates the potential for competition that is inherent in bilateral relations.
Other threats to sustained cooperation were also presented by increasing geopolitical rivalries between Iran and Iraq that were underwritten by an anticipated vacuum
of power in the Gulf following the anticipated British withdrawal in 1971, Iranian
military support for Kurdish movements in northern Iraq, and increasing military
cooperation of Iraq and the USSR in response to the Kurdish autonomy movement (See
Rubinstein, 1982, p. 83-9). While Rubinstein indicates that all of these factors definitely
strained relations during the mid-1970s, he also notes that “none of the issues was acute
enough to upset their détente” (p. 89).
Despite the otherwise substantive diplomatic and economic successes of these two
decades, only the dramatic events of 1979 and the subsequent shift in Iranian domestic
politics would ultimately lead to a serious rift in Iranian-Soviet relations (Milani, 2007, p.
330). Following the Shah’s ouster and the subsequent return to Iran of the Ayatollah
Khomeini in February 1979, the Ayatollah immediately declared a policy of nonalignment with either the East or West and began implementing a series of decisions
which would decisively fracture relations with the USSR (Parker, 2008, p. 6; Mamedova,
p. 11). No longer would Iran pursue a pragmatic policy of cooperation with Moscow
18

focused upon economic development and security gains; the new Islamic regime would
pursue an ideologically-driven foreign policy that chose to insulate Iran from the ongoing
geo-political rivalries between the USSR and United States that had polarized the region.
On May 11, 1979 Iran annulled articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty which
effectively opened up Iranian territory to third-party powers hostile to the USSR (Parker,
p. 8; Mamedova, p. 11). And while Khomeini’s regime may have sought to distance
itself from taking sides in the Cold War rivalry by pursuing a policy of genuine
independence, ultimately it could not insulate itself from the impact of ongoing geopolitical rivalries between the USSR and the United States.
By all accounts the USSR’s December 27th, 1979 invasion and subsequent
occupation of Afghanistan dealt a dramatic blow to bilateral relations between Moscow
and Tehran. According to multiple sources, the USSR’s decision to invade had been
premised upon the suspicion that following the removal of the Shah—a key ally to
Washington—the United States would seek to entrench itself in neighboring Afghanistan
as a means of maintaining regional influence and intelligence gathering capacity (Milani,
2007, p. 330). The forcefulness of Soviet policy no doubt disturbed the newly formed
regime in Iran as it demonstrated a new side to Soviet policy within the region, one that
now included direct military intervention. Overtime the ongoing conflict between the
Soviets and U.S. and Iranian-backed counter-revolutionaries would send more than 2
million refugees into neighboring Iran thereby causing the Ayatollah’s regime to bear the
extensive socio-economic and political burden of instability (Milani, p. 330). The Soviet
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occupation of Afghanistan was quickly followed by multiple invasions of the Soviet
embassy in Tehran and, as Parker notes, led Iran, just three later months, to once again
discontinue its export of natural gas supplies to Soviet Republics in Central Asia while
also directly curtailing its economic cooperation with the USSR (Parker, 2008, p.6, 12;
see also Mamedova, 2009, p. 11).
The eruption of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 only further worked to destroy ties
between Moscow and Tehran as the Ayatollah’s stated policy of independence from Cold
War alliances deprived it of much needed military support in the face of a growing
Western and Soviet-backed Iraq. Although Moscow’s direct provision of weaponry to
Iran largely ceased in 1978 (SIPRI, 2011, Arms Transfer Database), Parker indicates that
Moscow would continue to provide Tehran with supplies through indirect channels,
noting also that such ‘indirect flows’ were further ‘restricted’ in 1982 when Khomeini
both rejected Saddam Hussein’s calls to end ongoing hostilities while also calling for the
removal of the Baathist regime (Parker, 2008, p. 13).
By Parker’s account, the USSR had been concerned predominantly with
maintaining the status quo of power relations in the Middle East and saw the ongoing
conflict as likely to alter the existing balance of power by encouraging direct intervention
by the United States (Parker, 2008, p. 13). The withering of Soviet military support
preceded what Parker has referred to as the “low point” in bilateral relations that occurred
in 1983 as the Khomeini regime arrested and executed 45 members of the Moscowbacked communist Tudeh party in Iran and required the USSR to recall a substantial
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number of its diplomats from its embassy in Tehran (Parker, p. 16-17; Mamedova, 2009,
p. 11). Still, even in the midst of a radically diminished non-cooperation there are
indications that this ‘restricted’ flow of weapons from the USSR to Iran continued
throughout the life of the war. Citing a November 30, 1986 Sunday Times report, Reuters
has reported that the USSR had continued to send indirect flows of weapons to Iran as
part of a strategic imperative of building rapport with Iranian leaders that could be
capitalized upon following the anticipated death of Ayatollah Khomeini (Reuters, 1986,
November 30). According to these reports, the USSR secretly contributed weapons to
the Iranian war effort via North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Libya, and Syria” (Reuters).
Thus by the mid-1980s, political relations between the two nations had been strongly
undermined by ideological divisions and the polarizing effect of regional hostilities. But
the substantial decline in bilateral cooperation, once again, could not be expected to last.
According to Eva Patricia Rakel, years of international isolation, war fatigue, and
economic malaise, by the late 1980s, would encourage the Iranian leadership to seek out
cooperative engagement with regional powers as a means of restarting stalled national
development (Rakel, 2007, p. 170).

Relations in the Late-Soviet and Post-Soviet Era (1987-2011):
Developing a dependent variable of political affinity

1987-1991: New Beginnings in the Post-Communist Era
Average GPA Score for Period: 13.6, High-Level of Moderate Cooperation
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By 1987 the USSR and Iran began to take the very first steps towards a general
state of rapprochement, thereby ending nearly eight years of estrangement that had
followed in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Just one year prior in August of 1986, declining global oil prices had pushed Tehran to
reopen its sale of gas supplies to the Soviets (valued then at $2billion/year) as part of an
effort to boost its economy (Hiro, 1986, December 21), and by December of that same
year the Iranian-Soviet Standing Commission for Economic Cooperation (ISSCEC) met
in Tehran for the first time since the disruption of its activities in 1980 (Parker, 2008, p.
21; Hiro). According to Dilip Hiro writing for the Los Angeles Times, “The list of
industries included in [the ISSCEC] agreement was significant [and included]: transport,
steel mills, machine tools, power plants, fishing, banking, construction, and technology”
(Hiro). With the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akhbar Velayati visiting Moscow in
February 1987 and the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov visiting Tehran in
August that same year, both nations concluded new agreements over the construction of
power plants and refineries in Iran as well as the further development of related oil
pipelines and railways (Parker, p. 21). All of this served as increasing pretext for the
Ayatollah’s January 1st, 1989 letter to Soviet General Secretary Mikheil Gorbachev
which called for a return to cooperative engagement (Parker, p. 29; Mamedova, 2009, p.
12; Imam Khomeini official website).
Where Rakel has noted that Iran sought to reevaluate its relations with regional
partners in accordance with the rise of pragmatists in the Iranian policy bureaucracy who
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saw enhanced foreign relations as a means to economic reconstruction and continuing
political legitimacy (Rakel, 2007, p. 170), Parker and Mamedova indicate that the
ceasefire signed between Iran and Iraq in August of 1988 and the likelihood of a
forthcoming Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan provided the necessary pretext for
rapprochement (Parker, 2008, p. 29; Mamedova, 2009, p. 11). Parker determines that the
normalization of relations between the USSR and Iran specifically hinged upon the
Ayatollah Khomeini’s letter to Soviet General Secretary, Mikheil Gorbachev, in January
of 1989 which called for a return to cooperative engagement (Parker, p. 23, 29).
Following Khomeini’s letter of proposed cooperation and the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from Afghanistan the following month, both nations exchanged visits of
foreign ministers between February and March thereby laying the groundwork for a
proposed Iranian delegation to visit Moscow later that year in June (Parker, 2008, p. 29;
Mamedova, 2009, p. 12).

The June round of talks between high-ranking officials

(including both General Secretary Gorbachev and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani) would
come to define a turning point in Soviet-Iranian relations as it committed both nations to
cooperation across a wide range of issue areas through the year 2000 including: joint
economic development projects; cooperation in matters of regional security; cooperation
in the development of civilian nuclear energy programs; and a general agreement on the
sale of arms (Parker, p. 31-2, 36; Mamedova, p. 12).
Whether or not the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini just
three weeks prior to the delegation’s visit contributed to the highly cooperative outcome
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is uncertain, but appears likely given the fact that his passing has been associated with an
opening of policy space in Iran. According to Rakel, the death of Khomeini enabled
pragmatist and conservative party factions to actualize their growing preference for a
foreign policy based upon engagement rather than that of isolation and unilateralism
(Rakel 2009, p. 105, 116-18). One of the leading proponents of a more liberal foreign
policy was none other than the delegation’s leader and known pragmatist, then Speaker
of the Majlis, Hashemi Rafsanjani (Parker, 2008, p. 31). Within just two months of the
Moscow talks Rafsanjani would be elected to a redesigned presidency that entrusted the
executive with increasing control over foreign policy decision-making (Rakel 2007, p.
170). In the course of his presidency, Russian-Iranian relations would come to achieve
unprecedented levels of commercial, technical, and diplomatic cooperation through the
fulfillment of arms contracts and a program of nuclear development which had been
agreed upon during the June, 1989 talks.
Between 1989 and 1991, the Russian Federation would sign and begin delivery on
numerous contracts for a vast array of high-profile defense-related goods which signaled,
definitively, the beginning of Soviet-Iranian rapprochement.

While such weapons

transfers clearly included weapons systems that could be employed in an offensive
capacity (a fact that would become highly disturbing to Washington in the coming years),
Moscow had defended its emerging weapons relationship as one that was inherently
‘defensive’ in nature (Parker, 2008, p. 32; Kempster, 1989, June 24). These contracts
initially included the purchase and delivery of 24 Mig-29 and 12 Su24MK strike aircraft,
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an assortment of short-range anti-aircraft missiles (SRAAM) for fighter aircraft, surface
to air missiles (SAM), air to surface missiles (ASM), bomber aircraft, and air search radar
for use with missile systems, (SIPRI, 2011, Arms Transfer Database; Parker, p. 34).
Perhaps the most controversial contracts, however, were those authorizing orders for the
sale of 3 Kilo-class submarines which would be delivered to Iran between 1992 and 1993
(SIPRI). The USSR would also agree to the sale of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles
(IFV) and anti-tank missiles in 1991—in long-term contracts which would be delivered
on throughout the remainder of the decade (SIPRI); notably, however, the deliveries of
these later goods would not begin until 1993, due perhaps to a decline in general
cooperation during 1992—which as will be discussed in the following section—was
precipitated by the outbreak of the Tajik civil war.
It is tempting to ask whether or not the increasingly robust weapons relationship
of the early 1990’s was strategically important to leaders of the USSR who, at that time,
were fighting a political battle against republican nationalists seeking to dissolve the
longstanding USSR? Were such transfers signed in order to develop external support for
the USSR at a time of increasing risk to state sovereignty? Although the question is
difficult to answer, there is some indication that increasing political fragility of the USSR
may have been part of the motives for expanding weapons-based cooperation in the late
1980s and early 1990s. In September 1991, just three months prior to the Soviet Union’s
dissolution, General Secretary Gorbachev dispatched a letter to president Rafsanjani
reiterating the commitment of the each of the individual republics and Union as a whole
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to continued cooperation with the IRI (Parker, 2008, p. 37).

In this context it is

reasonable to suspect that a rapidly expanding weapons relationship was, in part,
designed to generate increasing diplomatic favor with Union allies. And while the longstanding Union would cease to exist in December of 1991, the Russian nationalist
administration of Boris Yeltsin would—throughout the remainder of the 1990s preside
over a deepening bilateral relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).
But weapons-based cooperation was not the only hallmark of this period.
Between 1987 and 1991 the Russian Republic and the Islamic Republic remained in
continuous agreement over the issue of Caspian Sea delimitation, subscribing still to the
200 mile Astara-Gasanguly (Hasan-Qoli) median line of demarcation which had been
informally agreed to in 1935 and was based upon existing Soviet-Iranian land borders
(Parker, 2008, p. 151; Mamedova, 2009, p. 7). Although Parker notes that the collapse of
the USSR in 1991 had re-opened up this informal regime to potential renegotiation, at
least through 1992 both nations still continued to endorse the median-line divider as well
as the existing ‘condominium-approach’ which provided both nations with equal rights in
respect to navigation and resource utilization (Parker, p. 150-1). As will be demonstrated
in the following section, the issue of Caspian Sea Delimitation would become
increasingly controversial throughout the decade as newly independent Caspian littoral
states began to stake claims to maritime resources in proximity to their coastline prior to
any successful renegotiation of the Caspian Sea legal regime.

26

In terms of bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear development prior to the
1989 agreements, the USSR had neither formally nor informally engaged Iran on the
topic—a sure sign of diminished bilateral affinity. While the June round of talks in 1989
did not produce specific contractual agreements between both parties to cooperate in the
field of nuclear power they did, in fact, establish a formal expectation that both parties
would work together in the future toward the “peaceful use of atomic energy” (Parker,
2008, p. 31; Mamedova, 2009, p. 12). According to Parker, Viktor Mikhaylov—former
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, would later report that the June 1989 agreements had
been the foundation for Russia’s later cooperation in the completion of Iran’s Bushehr
nuclear power plant (Parker, p. 111).
Thus the period of 1987 to 1991 can generally be treated as a period of initial
rapprochement

wherein

both

parties

committed

themselves

to

a

profound

reconceptualization of their mutual relationship, pursuing cooperation rather than
competition.

1992-1996: Navigating the complexities of post-Soviet affairs—challenges and
opportunities
Average GPA Score for Period: 15.625, Low-Level of High Cooperation
The five year period between 1992 and 1996 represents one of the most
interesting periods in Russian-Iranian relations since the general state of rapprochement
that began in 1989.

While the period, overall, is defined by a level of High

Cooperation—due to the ongoing trade in defense-related goods and the initial
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commitment of the Russian government to begin completion of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear
power plant—collaboration was still being challenged by the breakup of the Soviet Union
which had fractured the existing status quo of relations within Central Asia and the
Caspian region. The opportunity for expanded relations with the United States, the
outbreak of civil war in the former soviet republic of Tajikistan, and the re-evaluation of
the long-standing Caspian Sea regime by newly-independent littoral states would come to
place a substantial burden of pressure upon Russian-Iranian relations during this period
thereby threatening the fragile rapprochement that had been brokered in 1989.
Although the Russian republic emerged from the collapse of the USSR in full
possession of the Soviet Union’s former agreements with Iran, the direction of national
policy appeared uncertain in the early years of independence as Russia sought both to
maintain the status quo of relations with Iran while also exploring new relations with
Washington. The absence of normal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran was
a significant hurdle to the newly independent Russian republic as it sought to develop
bilateral relations with Iran based upon the USSR’s 1989 agreements. Continuing to
fulfill its controversial weapons contracts with Iran while also formalizing its
commitment to bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear technology, Russia’s policy of
engagement during this period became increasingly worrisome to officials in Washington
who feared the growing consequences of proliferation in weapons and dual-use
technology that could enable Iran to militarize its civilian nuclear program.
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In an effort to appease Washington during this era, Russian Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev in March 1993 visited Washington and proposed the establishment of a
new non-proliferation forum—the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (Parker, 2008, p.
113). While this commission would become increasingly important to Russian-U.S.
relations throughout the 1990s, the relationship would consistently be tested by the fact
that Russian-Iranian cooperation in the sale and transfer of weapons and nuclear based
technology continued to deepen as the decade progressed. Between 1992 and 1996
Moscow would negotiate new defense contracts with Iran for the provision of a Kiloclass submarine, diesel tank engines, as well as anti-tank missiles while also continuing
to make good on its deliveries of defense contracts signed in 1991 (SIPRI, 2011, Arms
Transfer Database).
In terms of bilateral nuclear cooperation, this period demonstrated the
development of agreements associated with Russia’s anticipated participation in the
construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant—a facility that had been left
uncompleted by the German firm Siemens in the wake of the 1979 revolution and IranIraq War (Orlov & Vinnikov, 2005, p. 50; Wehling, 1999, p. 136). Early agreements
were signed in August 1992 and according to Orlov and Vinnikov represented a
significant future commitment on the part of Russia to nuclear development in Iran
(Orlov & Vinnikov, 50; Parker, 113). Describing these agreements Orlov and Vinnikov
(2005) write:
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[N]uclear cooperation would consist of construction of nuclear power plants for
Iran, cycling nuclear fuel, supplying research reactors, reprocessing spent fuel,
producing isotopes for use in scientific research and medical research and training
of Iranian nuclear scientists at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (p. 50).
By January 1995 these agreements had led to a formal contract signing between
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) and the Iranian Atomic Energy
Organization (IAEO) for construction of the Bushehr 1 nuclear power plant at a cost to
Iran of $800 million USD (Orlov & Vinnikov, p. 51; Parker, 2008, p. 114) with a formal
construction

agreement

signed

between

IAEO

and

the

Russian

firm

Zarubezhatomenergostroi (Orlov & Vinnikov, p. 50-1).
Responding to international concerns that Russian collaboration in the field of
nuclear science could enable Iran to produce nuclear weapons, Russia’s Foreign
Intelligence Services (SVR) issued successive reports in 1993 and 1995 arguing that
bilateral cooperation was unlikely to enable Iran to produce a weapon (Orlov &
Vinnikov, 2005, p. 52; Parker, 2008, p. 115). And yet, while these reports vehemently
defended Russia’s cooperation as oriented solely toward the development of civilian
nuclear technology, analysts indicate that one of Yeltsin’s presidential advisory bodies,
the Security Council, had discovered a series of secretive side deals between MinAtom
Director Viktor Mikhaylov and the IAEO for the provision of 2000 tons of uranium,
uranium mining assistance, and a gas centrifuge capable of enriching the uranium to
“weapons-grade level,” as well as the training of Iranian scientists in Russia (Parker, p.
116-7; Orlov & Vinnikov, p. 52; Wehling, 1999, p. 136). Orlov and Vinnikov indicate
that the Security Council report was made available to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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which, in turn, cancelled the protocol of intent with the IAEO by May of 1995 (Orlov &
Vinnikov, p. 52). Despite the fact that the Russian Foreign Ministry formally sought to
suspended illicit nuclear cooperation with Iran, international officials clearly pressured
the Yeltsin regime to more aggressively pursue a policy of non-proliferation; there can be
little doubt that this added pressure did not negatively impact bilateral cooperation during
this period.
Between May and August of 1995 the Russian Federation would not only agree
(through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) to ending all bilateral arms cooperation
with Iran—following the completion of its existing contracts in 1999—but it also became
a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and a member of the
Wassenar Arrangement which aimed to curb “destabilizing transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies (Parker, 2008, p. 117; MTCR.org;
Wassenar.org). Thus while bilateral cooperation would continue in the short term, it
appeared that long-term cooperation with Iran was being sacrificed by the Kremlin as
part of a strategy aimed at cultivating favor with the West in the early post-Cold War era.
But emerging relations with Washington were not the only challenge to Russian-Iranian
cooperation during this era, the break-up of the Soviet Union had led to a dramatic
alteration in the regional status quo which placed new pressures of its own on the fragile
relationship.
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 had opened up the likelihood that the longstanding Caspian Sea delimitation regime between the Soviet Union and Iran would need
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to be revised in accordance with the maritime borders of four new independent nations
(Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) and Iran (MacDougall, 1997, p. 89;
Parker, 2008, p. 151). While Russia and Iran continued to publicly endorse a common
approach to Caspian Sea delimitation throughout this entire period (see Mahmoud
Ghafouri, 2008), elites within the Russian Federation became increasingly divided over
whether or not Moscow should continue to pursue a delimitation regime that was
strategically favorable and promoted ongoing cooperation with Iran or one that
maximized Russian economic opportunities at the cost of bilateral affinity (See Parker, p.
152-3).
Joint exploration and production opportunities (E&P) in Azerbaijan had attracted
Russian energy opportunists as early as 1993 thereby angering the Iranian leadership who
argued that states could not engage in unilateral E&P prior to the successful renegotiation
of the existing regime (Parker, 2008, p. 152-3). By the close of this period, RussianIranian relations would become increasingly strained not only over the formalization of
E&P contracts between Russia and Western corporations in Azerbaijan’s so-called
‘national sector’ but also over apparent Iranian reprisals which consisted of talks over
rival pipeline cooperation with both Turkey and Turkmenistan between December 1994
and August 1995 which challenged Moscow’s regional energy hegemony (Parker, p. 154;
Olcott, 2004, p. 11-13; Kemp, 2000, p. 153). And while divisions between policy elites in
Russia clearly contributed to growing bilateral tensions in this area, it is simultaneously
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the case that these same divisions likely functioned to stabilize cooperative relations by
mitigating more negative outcomes.
Despite the fact that Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin (then deputy premier in charge of the fuel and energy sector and Gazprom
Chair) had officially supported Russia’s participation in controversial Azerbaijani E&P
agreements—thereby suggesting a de facto policy reversal over issues of Caspian
delimitation—Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Services (SVR) under the Direction of
Yevgeny Primakov and the Foreign Ministry publicly argued in favor of renegotiating the
legal regime prior to commencement of E&P by any one nation (Parker, 2008, p. 149,
152-3; MacDougall, 1997, p. 97-99). Thus while Russia’s de facto policy reversal over
Caspian delimitation associated with the position of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin clearly
functioned to strain relations with Iran, high-level opponents of this policy likely
functioned—at minimum—to slow the growing rift between Russia and Iran over
Caspian delimitation during this period.
As Mahmoud Ghafouri’s research demonstrates, throughout this period both
Russia and Iran continued to rhetorically endorse the same delimitation regime, with both
nations arguing in favor of a condominium approach to resource utilization (Ghafouri,
2008); notably, in 1996 both nations (including also Turkmenistan) agreed to a change in
the existing regime which supported the extension of an excepted 10 mile offshore zone
to a 45 mile offshore zone (Ghafouri, 2008, p. 87-8). It seems more than likely that this
mutual modification of the existing delimitation regime functioned to quell growing
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tensions between the two nations. Russia’s willingness still to cooperate with Iran in
these matters may have been urged by the SVR and Foreign Ministry as part of a tactical
effort designed to encourage cooperation with the Islamic Republic at a time when Russia
required increasingly affine relations in order to preserve regional security.
One of the leading challenges to Russian-Iranian relations during this era was the
outbreak of civil war in the newly independent Republic of Tajikistan (Parker, 2008, p.
57; Power, 1993, August 6). Growing tensions between the ruling Tajik government of
communist leader Rahmon Nabiyev and the domestic Islamic Revival Party during 1992
had attracted the diplomatic and tactical military support of the Iranian government,
thereby stirring fears within Moscow over the role that Iran might choose to play within
Russia’s predominantly Muslim regions as well as in the greater post-Soviet sphere
(Parker, p. 57, 71, 73, 74; Freedman, 1997, p. 105). Having experienced a large-scale
revival of domestic Islamic political movements in the wake of the USSR, along with
recent memories of fighting Islamist forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s, Moscow
was by the early 1990s already highly sensitive to the potentially disruptive role Iran
could play within the region (Trenin & Malashenko, 2004, p. 12; Power, 1993). Parker
has indicated that following Nabiyev’s ouster by Islamic opposition forces in September
1992, Russia—principally through the Foreign Ministry and SVR (Parker, p. 86, 97)—
became deeply involved in the brokering of peace and engaged Iran directly on the topic
by tying the future of bilateral relations to the Islamic Republic’s behavior in Tajikistan
(Parker, p. 80, 86).
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With work on a new draft political treaty between the Russian Republic and Iran
underway by October, and a recent August 1992 agreement signed on the construction of
a nuclear power plant in Iran, Russian leaders successfully worked to change the course
of Iranian behavior in Tajikistan (Parker, 2008, p. 86, 113). By Parker’s account, Iranian
support for opposition forces was effectively concluded by 1993 and was replaced by a
new joint-effort of both Russian and Iranian leaders to broker negotiations between Tajik
parties beginning in April 1994 (Parker, p. 81, 86). Although episodic conflict among
Tajik opponents would continue throughout negotiations, Russian-Iranian diplomatic
coordination on this matter has been widely recognized as contributing to the eventual
peace agreement signed between Tajik disputants in Moscow during June of 1997 and
represents a significant accomplishment in terms of bilateral cooperation (Parker, p. 176;
Rakel, 2007, p. 171).

1997-2001: Cooperation under Pressure
Average GPA Score for Period: 14.475, Low-Level of High Cooperation

Between 1997 and 2001, Russian-Iranian relations would face many of the same
challenges that had evolved in the preceding era. Although hostilities in Tajikistan would
be resolved by June 1997 due to the well-coordinated diplomatic efforts of both nations
(Freedman, 1997, p. 106; Parker, 2008, p. 176), continuing pressure from Washington
and the international community over arms cooperation and collaboration in developing
Iranian nuclear technology as well as disagreements over Caspian Sea delimitation would
35

function to moderate the overall level of cooperation between the two nations.
Nevertheless, this period would continue to exhibit the same high level of cooperation
that had defined the preceding five-year period thereby demonstrating the importance of
their mutually beneficial relationship to one another.
Analysts have frequently pointed out that Russian-Iranian relations have generally
been impacted by qualitative changes in each nation’s overall relationship with
Washington. This paper does not dispute that fact. Rather, it asks instead the question,
‘what is the significance of third-party relations with Washington and other western
powers on the political dyad when compared to national security concerns and changes in
domestic politics?’ Although pressure from Washington would cause Russian leaders to
pursue policy options that would otherwise continue to strain bilateral relations during
this era, it is simultaneously the case that this same period would demonstrate a great deal
of bilateral political affinity between Russia and Iran, even leading Parker to conclude
that 1997 had been the high point of bilateral relations (Parker, 2008, p. x). The push by
Washington on Moscow to curb the proliferation of restricted technologies certainly
intensified during this period but, as will be shown, did not apparently restrict the
ongoing level of cooperation in conventional weapons and nuclear technology.
In April 1997 Majlis Speaker, Nateq-Nuri, visited Moscow in what had until then
been called the “highest level Iranian sojourn to the Russian capital since that by
Rafsanjani in 1989” (Parker, 2008, p. 118). During this visit officials signed an important
mutual agreement on export controls that had been pending since December 1996
36

(Parker, p. 119). Although the agreement rhetorically sought to curb the proliferation of
trade in restricted technologies, Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) has noted that Washington remained highly concerned about the stability of
Russian non-proliferation commitments during this period and briefed Russian officials
(via the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) in September 1997 of ongoing violations of
the non-proliferation regime by various Russian corporations (Katzman, 1998, p. 2);
according to Katzman, “Vice President Gore said that a U.S.-Russian inquiry had
uncovered a vigorous Iranian effort to obtain nuclear and ballistic missile technology
from Russia” (Katzman, p.2). Katzman’s report demonstrates that by 1998 U.S. officials
had taken decisive action to induce Russian efforts to curb illegal proliferation signing
into law the Fiscal Year 1998 Foreign Aid Appropriations Law which sought to “[cut]
50% of U.S. aid to the Russian government unless it [ended] nuclear or ballistic missile
cooperation with Iran” (Katzman, p. 3). Similarly, beginning in April 1998, Washington
began placing sanctions on “select” Russian corporations suspected of participation in
illegal transfers of dual-use technology (Parker, p. 122).
As a response to such measures, the Russian government took overt and dramatic
steps to convince Washington, and the international community, that it was complying
with the non-proliferation regime.

On January 28, 1998 Prime Minister Viktor

Chernomyrdin signed Directive Number 57 which Parker notes was designed to “close
loopholes in Russian anti-proliferation legislation” (Parker, 2008, p. 122). Just two
months later in March 1998 the Yeltsin administration would take further public steps to
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restrict the flow of dual-use technologies by appointing Andrei Kokoshin as the Secretary
of the President’s Security Council (a presidential advisory group) (Parker, p. 120).
According to Parker, Kokoshin would come to play a “active role in elaborating and
implementing new export controls designed to impede the unsanctioned flow of weapons
and technology to Iran” (Parker, p. 120). By May of 1998, the administration would take
even more pragmatic steps to curb proliferation by issuing a directive which placed
‘export control units’ in all Russian firms working in the nuclear and missile-related
industries (Katzman, 1998, p. 2) while also working to subvert underground procurement
activities of Iranian agents inside Russia that were focused on obtaining “missile
guidance systems and liquid-fuel booster technology” (Parker, p. 121). And by July of
1998, Parker indicates that President Boris Yeltsin would name Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration, Vladimir Putin, as Director of the Federal Security Services
(FSB), “with what appeared to be a mandate to rein in that agency’s reported collusion in
the illicit transfer of dual-use technology and parts to Iran” (Parker, p. 130, 132-3).
Citing a former Security Council staffer, Vladimir Lebedev, Parker writes that “Putin,
while FSB head from July 1998 to August 1999, was the architect of Russian
nonproliferation policy” (Parker, p. 134). And yet, despite high-profile Russian efforts to
curb illegal proliferation, both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations would pursue
policies which simultaneously undermined these efforts—demonstrating a desire still to
cater to Iranian procurement activities.
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In particular, a May 1998 decision to replace MinAtom Director, Viktor
Mikhaylov, with Yevgeny Adamov, a former head of the Scientific Research and Design
Institute for Energy Technologies (NIKIET), demonstrated the Yeltsin administration’s
willingness to take chances with the non-proliferation campaign (see Parker, 2008, p.
137-40). Citing Russian media reports, Parker notes that between 1992 and 1998 while
working for NIKIET, Adamov had presided over unilateral deals with the Iranian
government for the provision of technologies aimed at enriching uranium (Parker, p.
140). These activities would lead the U.S., just one year later, to sanctioning NIKIET for
the “transfer of missile and nuclear technologies to Iran” (Parker, p. 138). Also
noteworthy, was the decision of recently elected president Vladimir Putin in May of 2000
to amend a 1992 nuclear technology export control decree, which reportedly gave the
“green light to MinAtom negotiations with Iran for three more nuclear power units”
valued at $2 billion USD (Parker, p. 138). Thus although both the Yeltsin and Putin
administrations were clearly responsive to western calls to curb illicit proliferation, both
governments simultaneously pursued policies that functioned to reassure Iranian officials
of their ongoing commitment to cooperation in the nuclear sphere. The same was true
regarding the longstanding trade in arms.
By 1999, Parker indicates that Moscow was becoming increasingly divided over
the negative security implications associated with the continuation of the nation’s decadelong support of defense-related goods to Iran, emphasizing especially how such
technology could be used to harm Russian energy interests within the region (Parker,
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2008, p. 135-7). Nevertheless, despite protests to the contrary, the Kremlin appeared
intent throughout the period on increasing the sale of conventional weapons. According
to SIPRI records, between 1997 and 2001, Moscow would sign new agreements for the
sale of towed guns, infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) turrets, anti-tank missiles, and
helicopters (SIPRI-Arms Transfer Database). Deliveries on these contracts as well as
existing contracts signed in 1991 (anti-tank missiles, IFVs, tanks), 1993 (diesel tank
engines), and 1995 (anti-tank missiles) make this five year period one of the most robust
eras of cooperation in terms of actual numbers of contracts being both signed and
delivered on (SIPRI). But the most defining moment of Russia’s ongoing commitment to
the trade in conventional weapons came from a Russian Security Council announcement
in March 2000 that indicated the Kremlin was considering backing out of its June 30th,
1995 commitment in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to ending conventional
weapons sales to Iran after 1999 (Parker, p. 143). By Parker’s account, the Russian
Federation had supported its decision citing the fact that it had only fulfilled 50% of its
defense commitments to the IRI and needed until 2010 to complete them (p. 143). Thus
while Washington may have made significant inroads towards curbing the proliferation
of illicit technologies, the relationship in conventional weapons supply was clearly
expanded. By November 2000, Russia would only further demonstrate its commitment
to the ongoing conventional weapons relationship when officials announced that the
Federation would formally withdraw from the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission on
December 1 (Parker, p. 143; Katz, 2006, p. 1).
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In March of 2001 President Putin hosted a summit in Moscow with Iranian
reformist president Khatami, although both presidents would come to sign the Treaty on
the Basic Elements of Relations and the Principles of Cooperation, Parker reveals that the
treaty, itself, did not significantly alter the existing nature of bilateral relations and did
not describe Russia and Iran as ‘strategic partners’ (2008, p. 209). Nevertheless, the
summit was notable insofar as it clearly reinforced the Federation’s decision to withdraw
from the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission as both leaders discussed future arms
agreements valued at $7 billion USD—thereby demonstrating considerable political
amity between the two nations (Parker, p. 209).
In terms of the ongoing question of Caspian Sea delimitation, this period
represents a significant emerging challenge to bilateral cooperation as the Russian
government moved away from consensus with Iran. Although both Russia and Iran had
continued—officially—to endorse a jointly-authorized, condominium approach to living
and non-living resource utilization with an excepted 45 off-shore exclusive zone and a
jointly navigable sea surface, beginning in 1998 the Yeltsin administration made a
decisive step towards an alternate delimitation regime. In July 1998, the administration
formally agreed to open negotiations with Kazakh officials over a new regime known as
the Modified Median Line (MML) (Ghafouri, 2008, p. 88; Parker, 2008, p. 157).
According to Ghafouri and Parker, a MML division of the Caspian Sea sought to divide
the seabed into sovereign national sectors based upon a median line that was consistent
with national coastlines, leaving both the sea surface and water column freely navigable
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by all parties (Ghafouri, p. 87-8; Parker, p. 157). While Russia and Kazakhstan would
not formally sign a delimitation agreement implementing this change of protocol until
May of 2003 (Ghafouri, p. 88), the opening of negotiations prompted Iranian protests
which surely functioned to strain bilateral relations.
Iranian dissatisfaction with the MML approach was likely a product of two key
revisions to the existing delimitation regime. In the first instance, while a condominium
approach to resource utilization effectively ensured each nation’s participation in all E&P
activities outside of the exclusive off-shore economic zones—by investing each nation
with veto power over project development—the new MML approach divided the seabed
into unequal national sectors that were to be considered sovereign territory (Parker, 2008,
p. 151-2; Ghafouri, 2008, p. 88). As Parker has noted, the condominium principle of
resource utilization in the post-Soviet era would have encouraged all littoral states
operating E&P projects to include both Iran and Russia into their operations as a way of
avoiding costly vetoes by both nations (Parker, p. 151-2); under an MML regime, Iranian
and Russian participation was no longer guaranteed.

Secondly, an MML approach

maximized the potential economic gains of North Caspian nations like Azerbaijan,
Russia, and Kazakhstan which were more likely to prosper owing to their lengthy
coastlines, abundant resources, and shallow waters (a contingency which functioned to
reduce project costs) (Parker, p. 151-2). In contrast, under an MML approach southern
nations like Iran and Turkmenistan had significantly shorter coastlines which meant they
could legally claim a smaller share of the seabed (Parker, p. 151-2). The negative impact
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of the MML regime was only further amplified by the fact that the Southern Caspian was
generally less abundant in hydrocarbon resources and was considerably deeper making
production costs more prohibitive.
The value to Iran of a condominium approach cannot be overstated when one
considers the context of ongoing political relations between Iran and the United States at
this time. In response to Iranian nuclear ambitions and its support for regional terrorist
organizations, President Clinton signed into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ISA) in
1995, which “banning U.S. trade with and investment in Iran,” also sought to, “curb the
strategic threat from Iran by hindering its ability to modernize its key petroleum sector,
which generates about 20% of Iran’s GDP” (Katzman, 2007, p. 1).

This act was

immediately followed up with the Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act (IFOSA), which
required the U.S. president to apply U.S. sanctions against foreign firms that provided
Iran with energy-related technology (Katzman, p. 2). Under these sanctions, third party
corporations choosing to invest more than $20 million USD in Iranian hydrocarbon
projects would be effectively prevented from doing business with U.S. based entities
(Katzman, p. 2). The ability of Iran to veto the national E&P projects of other Caspian
littoral states under a condominium regime could conceivably provide the IRI with
enough leverage over its neighbors to effectively ensure that the U.S. decree would be
ignored among Caspian nations. On the other side of the equation, Caspian littoral states
required the technical assistance of Western corporations for the development of the
Caspian’s hydrocarbon resources and so could not reasonably afford to ignore
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Washington’s decree; by rejecting a condominium approach in favor of the MML regime,
newly independent Caspian littorals could effectively insulate themselves from
mandatory participation with Iran in hydrocarbon E&P activities. Thus Russia’s 1998
push toward MML negotiations with Kazakhstan not only functioned to practically
restrict the sheer amount of hydrocarbon resources available to Iran but, perhaps more
importantly, demonstrated to the Iranian leadership that the Kremlin would be hesitant to
side with Tehran in its diplomatic war with the United States whenever the question of
hydrocarbon resources was raised.
Tensions between Iran and other Caspian littorals grew substantially in 2001 as
Iran began to officially pursue its own delimitation regime known as the 20% Equal
Share Division (ESD). Beginning in March 2001, the Iranian Oil Ministry formally
entered into an agreement with a Swedish firm GVA over the construction of a deepwater drilling rig that was to be located in Iran’s unilaterally-claimed national sector
(Parker, 2008, p. 158). Not entirely dissimilar from the MML approach, the ESD regime
simply divided both the sea bed and surface into five equal national sectors (Ghafouri,
2008, p. 89). Not only would this approach increase Iran’s seabed territory from 13% of
the Caspian under the MML regime to a proposed 20% share, but it also sought to
nationalize the sea surface thereby subjecting naval transportation within the sea to the
regime of state sovereignty (Ghafouri, p. 89; Parker, p. 151-2). Iran’s desire to pursue an
ESD approach was clearly an affront to the Russian Federation which operated the sea’s
largest naval force and, as Ghafouri and Parker note, had been free to navigate the sea
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surface under both the condominium and MML approaches to delimitation (Ghafouri, p.
89; Parker, p. 162).
By January 2001, Azerbaijan had agreed, in principle, to Russia and Kazakhstan’s
mutual approach toward delimitation, thereby establishing a viable consensus among a
majority of Caspian littorals (Parker, 2008, p. 160). The definitive change in Azerbaijani
policy orientation brought the issue of Caspian delimitation to the fore as Azerbaijani
claims under the MML came into conflict with Iranian claims under ESD. In July of that
same year, Iran officially protested Azerbaijan’s E&P activities in the Alborz/Alov fields
claiming that they violated Iran’s national sector—an argument which resulted in the
Iranian navy’s intimidation of two British Petroleum (BP) research vessels on loan to the
State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) (Parker, p. 158).
Although 2002 would come to represent the lowest point in Russian-Iranian
agreement on Caspian delimitation since 1935, the case can quite clearly be made that
cooperation in this area was effectively ended by 2001. Notably, Parker indicates that it
was in this very same year—under the administration of Vladimir Putin—that
‘government representatives’ first gained a controlling number of seats on the Gazprom
board (a partially-privatized state natural gas monopoly) (Parker, 2008, p. 148). The de
facto renationalization of Gazprom and subsequent moves by the Russian state to control
the formation of energy policy among post-Soviet nations in the coming years would
only further place both Russia and Iran at odds with one another as both sought to assert
control over regional hydro-carbon exports (Freedman, 2001, p. 71).
45

2002-2006: Cooperation vanishing
Average GPA Score for Period: 11.59, Moderate-Level of Moderate Cooperation
Disagreements over Caspian delimitation had certainly strained bilateral relations
in the preceding period as each nation was forced to redefine its preferred policy position
in the post-Soviet era; and yet, despite increasing pressures from the international
community over security-related concerns, trade in conventional arms and cooperation in
the field of nuclear science had remained relatively robust thereby preserving a clearly
moderate level of political affinity. But the continuation of political affinity would be
severely challenged following revelations in 2003 and 2004 that Iran had been secretly
working towards the enrichment of uranium. While the regime would claim that the
domestic enrichment of uranium was part of a larger goal of developing an independent
nuclear fuel cycle for the generation of peaceful nuclear power, continued failings of the
Iranian leadership to publicly disclose the status or intentions of its program—as well as
its generous reserves of natural gas which could also be used to produce electricity—
undermined the faith of the international community. Russian diplomatic support as well
as its ongoing technical cooperation in the nuclear field, no doubt, served to buoy
political relations in this period, but already there were signs that the partnership was
growing increasingly fragile—further drift in the Caspian delimitation regime, the
signing of only a few new agreements for conventional weapons, and delay over the
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Bushehr nuclear power plant’s completion were concrete signs that political collaboration
was now in increasing jeopardy.
Between 2002 and 2006 the trade in conventional weapons between the two
nations had continued without significant interruption but it was already clear that
cooperation was on its decline. According to SIPRI records which denote the number of
new and existing conventional weapons contracts in any given year, it can clearly be
shown that during this period—although the arms trade was still robust—it was, in fact,
beginning to lag. Taking the average annual number of contracts being both signed and
delivered on for consecutive five-year periods, figure 2 (below) demonstrates not only
the subtle trade decline experienced during the period 2002-06 but also the more
significant reduction that was soon to occur in this study’s closing period 2007-10.
Between 2002 and 2006 the Russian Federation and Islamic Republic would sign
four new contracts for short range anti-aircraft missiles (SRAAM), ground attack
systems,

surface-to

air-missiles

(SAM), as well as mobile SAM
systems

(SIPRI

Database).

Arms

Transfer

Meanwhile

Moscow

would continue its deliveries on

Figure 2: Average Number of Arms-Related Contracts in
Successive 5-year periods (1987-2010).

previously signed contracts for antitank missiles (up through 2010),
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diesel engines for tanks (up through 2003), towed guns (up through 2002), IFV turrets
(up through 2010), and helicopters (up through 2003). Despite the subtle decline in the
conventional weapons trade during this period there were no other significant
developments.
Regarding Caspian Sea delimitation, the 2002-06 period demonstrated the further
consolidation of national positions advanced in the preceding era as well as the
emergence of a decidedly conflictive disposition in Russian-Iranian relations. Between
April and May of 2002, Russian president Vladimir Putin would not only officially reject
Iran’s ESD approach to Caspian delimitation, but would also sign a completed
delimitation agreement with Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev based upon the
MML approach to demarcation; by September president Putin would sign a similar
bilateral agreement with Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliev (Parker, 2008, p. 161).
Although these agreements did not establish a new formal consensus on Caspian
delimitation among all littoral states, they did suggest Russia’s de facto reversal of the
traditional cooperative regime which had been adhered to by both nations since the treaty
of 1935.
The signing of official bilateral delimitation agreements in the spring and fall of
2002 can be linked to a Russian policy change on hydrocarbon resource development in
the Caspian basin and Central Asia which that had been officially endorsed by Putin in
January of 2002 and which clearly placed Russia and Iran at increasing odds with one
another. By Parker’s account president Putin had unveiled a new plan in January of 2002
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aimed at incorporating Central Asian nations into a natural gas cartel or ‘alliance’ that
was to be spear-headed by the Russian Federation and which would aim ultimately to
control the flow of regional hydro-carbon exports to expanding markets in Europe and
Asia (Parker, 2008, p. 149). Notably, Parker indicates that Putin’s project—at least in
part—sought to undermine Iran’s own efforts to capture the downstream European
market. Parker writes:
The project aimed at a Gazprom monopoly on less expensive Central Asian
natural gas exports in order to greatly increase Gazprom’s profit margin in
lucrative European markets. Together with the Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey,
Putin’s Gazprom-led ‘alliance’ cemented Russia’s position as the dominant
supplier of natural gas to much of Europe and blocked Iran from any attempt to
move in and whittle down Russia’s market share (Parker, 149).
Possessing 991.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, Iran holds the world’s
second largest reserves and so clearly presented a challenge to the Russian Federation
which—through the partially-privatized multinational corporation Gazprom—both
possesses the world’s largest natural gas reserves (1,680 tcf) and operates the world’s
most extensive pipeline transit system known as the Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS)
(Statistics, U.S. Energy Information Administration “World Proved Reserves of Oil and
Natural Gas”).
While the petroleum industry had accounted for 25% of federal government
revenue in 1998 on the eve of Putin’s presidency, independent reports indicate that by
2008 energy receipts would come to account for fully 50% of all federal revenues—
thereby demonstrating the increasing importance of energy to matters of Russian state
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policy during this and later periods (Kwon, 2006, p.2; Foglizzo, 2008). Given the fast
increasing importance of energy receipts to federal coffers there can be little doubt that
matters of energy export were becoming increasingly salient in terms of bilateral
cooperation.
Surely there can be no coincidence that Putin’s January 2002 announcement of a
Central Asian gas alliance had followed the December 2001/January 2002 opening of the
rival Tabriz-Ankara natural gas pipeline which functioned to transport natural gas
supplies from Iran (and potentially Eastern Caspian littoral nations like Turkmenistan) to
Turkey and on to Europe (BBC 2006, November 2; Parker, 2008, p. 154). By Parker’s
account, the Iran-Turkey line presented the first credible challenge to Russia’s hegemony
over regional exports (Parker, p. 154) and so acted as a considerable threat to a state
which was in the process of deepening its dependency upon energy-related revenues.
Thus there can be little doubt that the emerging competition over energy resources and
their distribution to downstream markets placed a significant strain on bilateral relations
in this period and was likely the basis for the growing divergence over issues of Caspian
delimitation.
Noteworthy also is the fact that less than two weeks after the signing of bilateral
delimitation agreements between Russia and Azerbaijan in September 2002, the Russian
Navy conducted what Parker has referred to as an “unprecedented” military exercise in
the Caspian, perhaps demonstrating to all nations the critical weight which Moscow’s
leadership was now assigning to the control of regional energy exports (Parker, 2008, p.
50

162). According to Parker, these exercises had deeply concerned the Iranian leadership,
he writes, “[Iranian] advisers feared that Russia wanted to maintain a condominium
approach to the Caspian’s surface so that Russia’s Caspian flotilla—substantially larger
than Iran’s—could exercise ‘hegemony’ over the other four littoral states” (Parker, p.
162).
Throughout the remainder of this period, Russia would come to consolidate its
control over the direction of regional gas exports by signing a series of bilateral
production agreements in the Eastern Caspian and Central Asian region; through these
agreements Moscow would effectively lock-up regional supplies thereby preventing their
export through competing Iranian (Tabriz-Ankara) or U.S.-backed pipelines (Nabucco).
In April 2003, September 2005, and November 2005 Parker indicates that Russia’s
Gazprom Corporation would conclude successive long-term gas production and transit
agreements with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan that would effectively
provide Moscow with virtual control over the region’s natural gas reserves (Parker, 2008,
p. 283). Following these acquisitions in June of 2005, the Russian state purchased 2.5
billion additional shares of Gazprom stock which provided the Russian state with a
50.002% controlling interest—the largest concentration of state-owned stock in Gazprom
since its privatization in the early 1990s (See Appendix Table A. 1, figures supplied by
Gazprom; Parker, 2008, p. 283). Parker indicates that by 2006 Gazprom would largely
come to control nearly all gas exports to countries in Eastern Europe and would control
substantial portions of gas supplies used by the EU’s predominant powers such as
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Germany and France (44% and 25% respectively) (Parker, p. 283). Russia’s European
position was only further enhanced during this period by the efforts of Kremlin-friendly
corporations to acquire controlling interests in downstream Central and Eastern European
energy assets (pipelines, refineries, petro-chemical plants, and retail outlets) which
effectively provided Moscow with increasing control over the sourcing of imports (See
Bugajski, 2008). This activity only further functioned to isolate other Caspian producer
nations from downstream energy markets and therefore would likely have added
increasing strain to Russian-Iranian relations.
That Russia’s new Caspian delimitation regime also functioned to enhance
Moscow’s control over regional energy production and exports—and hence the stability
of its downstream markets—seems likely.

More importantly, Moscow’s changing

attitudes towards the importance of Caspian and Central Asian energy in this period
clearly placed Russia and Iran into increasingly competitive positions. As mentioned in
the preceding section, Russia’s transition to a series of Caspian delimitation agreements
based upon the MML principle functioned both to isolate Iran from the maritime
production activities of other littoral nations as well as to restrict Iran’s overall share of
the Caspian to a small percentage of the seabed and water column consisting of fewer
harder to reach hydrocarbon reserves.

Simultaneously, the MML’s insistence on

maintaining free mobility of the sea-surface likely preserved the Russian navy’s right to
protect future joint venture projects in disputed territories from interference by aggrieved
Caspian littorals such as had been the case between Iran and Azerbaijan during 2001.
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But the strain hydrocarbon resources were placing on bilateral relations during this period
was not the only important development; revelations during this era that Iran was, in fact,
seeking to develop a domestic nuclear fuel cycle would only further ignite international
criticism of bilateral cooperation in nuclear science and technology.
Although future nuclear cooperation appeared promising in December of 2002
with discussions between Russia’s MinAtom and Iran calling for evaluations of the
construction of a second nuclear reactor, that same month a Washington-based, Iranian
opposition group disclosed reports based on commercial satellite imagery that suggested
Iran was both enriching uranium at the site of Natanz and making ‘weapons-grade’
plutonium in Arak (Parker, 2008, p. 215-17; Katz, 2006, p. 1). According to Parker,
Iranian president Mohammad Khatami responded to these charges indicating that Iran
was, in fact, attempting to develop the technology that would enable it to produce a
complete ‘indigenous’ nuclear fuel cycle that could be used to fuel as many as six nuclear
reactors engaged in the production of electricity (Parker, p. 217).

Analysts have

frequently suggested that Iran’s comparative advantage in natural gas (which is
commonly used in the production of electricity) should preclude the need for developing
highly controversial nuclear technology; thus the argument is made that Iran is likely
invested in developing nuclear power for use in military applications (Saberi, 2006,
August 1). Although the argument is not without some level of merit, Iranian officials
have expressed the idea that nuclear power generation would not only preserve Iran’s
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non-renewable hydrocarbon resources, but from an economic standpoint would also free
up more reserves for production and export (Saberi).
Iran’s admissions prompted a visit by International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Director General El Baradei to Iran in February 2003. According to Parker, El
Baradei’s report confirmed that Iran had installed 100 gas centrifuges to be used for the
enrichment of uranium, further noting that the IRI had plans to develop an additional
50,000 centrifuges at the Natanz facility (Parker, 2008, p. 217). The admission had
clearly placed a strain on bilateral relations as was evident by Russia’s decision to
support the June 2003 Joint Declaration of the G-8 Summit which urged Iran to formally
agree to an IAEA additional protocol (Orlov & Vinnikov, 2005, p. 55). The degree of
strain, however, appears to have been only slight insofar as Russian president Vladimir
Putin agreed to continue cooperation in the nuclear sphere, provided Iran was willing to
allow its operations to be overseen by the IAEA (Parker, p. 220-1). In the wake of such
events Iran appeared clearly willing to cooperate and so delivered a full disclosure of all
of its nuclear programs to the IAEA (October 2003) while also signing an IAEA protocol
requesting the “temporary and voluntary” suspension of all enrichment activities (Parker,
p. 253).
While such moves clearly diffused some of the tensions weighing upon bilateral
relations and so provided a reasonable basis for continued cooperation in the
development of the Bushehr facility there were signs that members of Russia’s policy
community were becoming increasingly distrustful of continued cooperation. Orlov and
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Vinnikov indicate that an October 2003 Ministry of Defense report had, “listed Iran,
alongside North Korea, as a country with an ‘unclear status’ as far as a nuclear weapons
program was concerned” (2005, p. 55). While the Ministry of Defense’s position did not
fully represent Moscow’s thoughts on cooperation with Tehran it did represent a
significant sub-sector of the government that had long been skeptical of bilateral
cooperation. According to Parker, in December 1996, amid a flurry of western criticism
over cooperation in conventional weapons, Russia’s Defense Minister, Igor Rodinov,
“had included Iran among countries that represented an increasing military danger”
(Parker, 2008, p. 120). The layers of distrust within Russia’s policy community seemed
only to deepen, however, following revelations at the Natanz facility.

Orlov and

Vinnikov have written, “An internal decision seems to have been made at some point
between 2002 and 2003 not to speed up the full completion of the Bushehr nuclear power
plant project, invoking technical reasons” (Orlov & Vinnikov, p. 55).

Thus while

cooperation continued, the revelations of 2003 likely were functioning to restrain the
scale of future collaboration as evident through completion delays.
By early 2004 IAEA investigations had discovered efforts by Iran to conceal the
construction of a “more advanced centrifuge design” known as the P-2 (Parker, 2008, p.
254). The G-8 once again took up the issue in the June Summit, this time issuing a
declaration, signed by Russia, which “aimed at ending nuclear fuel cycle cooperation
with states that violate their nuclear non-proliferation and IAEA safeguard obligations…”
(Orlov & Vinnikov, 2005, p. 55). In the wake of the Summit Iran fully acknowledged
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that it had not suspended its nuclear enrichment program and had been actively building
centrifuges and seeking out 37 tons of yellowcake for nuclear fuel production (Parker, p.
254).

By November 2004, Iran would sign an agreement with the EU-3 (France,

Germany, and UK) agreeing to fully suspend its enrichment activities in an interim period
of negotiations (Parker, p. 255). The decision to cooperate with the EU-3 appears to have
once again paid dividends in terms of Russian-Iranian cooperation as by December 2004
both nations had “launched discussions on the possible construction of up to seven more
nuclear power plants totaling 6,000-7,000 megawatts of power” (Orlov & Vinnikov, p.
60-1).
Moscow continued to deepen its nuclear cooperation with Iran in the wake of the
December agreements with the EU-3. While both nations would sign an important spent
fuel return agreement in February 2005 which called for the release of all spent nuclear
fuel to Russian authorities for further disposal, Russian officials would take additional
steps to demonstrate considerable diplomatic support for continued cooperation with Iran
(Katz, 2006, p. 1; Parker, 2008, p. 255). That same month Russia would use its veto
power as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to
formally reject U.S. calls for imposing related international sanctions and by July 2005
would welcome Iran as an observer into the Central Asian regional security regime—the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Parker, p. 256, 281).
Shortly after Iran’s entrance into the SCO as an observer, on August 1, 2005 the
IRI notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion; just two days later neo56

conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be elected to the Iranian presidency (Katz,
2006, p. 2; Parker, 2008, p. 256). The new presidential administration of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad represented a decisive reorientation away from the reformist policies of the
previous administration and was more ideologically aligned with the former
revolutionaries of the Khomeini era which favored policies of aggravation towards the
west (Rakel, 2009, p. 122). Just one month later on September 17, 2005, in an address to
the UN General Assembly, president Ahmadinejad defended the IRI’s right to
domestically produce a complete nuclear fuel cycle indicating that international contracts
of fuel delivery were highly unreliable and not legally binding (Parker, 2008, p. 258).
Parker indicates that, “The immediate shift in Iran’s negotiating posture with the EU-3
forced Moscow to adjust its own approach” (Parker, p. 256). Between September 2005
and June 2006 Russia would pursue an increasingly complex policy designed to balance
its relations with both Iran and the international community. While some tangible signs
of political affinity would still remain, it was simultaneously true that Russia’s diplomatic
support for the IRI was growing increasingly thin.
Shortly after Ahmadinejad’s speech before the United Nations, the IAEA decided
to turn the issue over to the UNSC. Despite the fact that both Russia and China had
abstained from the IAEA vote thereby allowing the issue to pass to the UNSC, in
November 2005, Moscow proposed a concessionary plan that would allow Iran to
temporarily continue enrichment activities so long as it remained committed to finding a
permanent solution in the context of ongoing EU-3 negotiations (Parker, 2008, p. 258).
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Russia offered further enticements to the IRI leadership by simultaneously signing
additional agreements for Pechora-2A SAM systems, as well as agreements on the sale of
29 or 30 Tor-M1 air defense systems valued at $1billion USD, while agreeing also to aid
Iran in the launching of an Iranian remote-sensing spy satellite (Katz, 2006, p. 3; Parker,
p. 260). Although new arms agreements were clearly on the table, Russia was also
becoming increasingly supportive of efforts which pushed the nuclear issue before the
UNSC. In February 2006 just one month after Iran announced that it had resumed
enrichment activities at the Natanz facility, Russia would support an IAEA Board of
Governor’s decision to supply the UNSC with Director El Baradei’s findings and
recommendations (Katz, 2006, p. 3; Parker, p. 261). While Russia would initially oppose
any talk of imposing sanctions on Iran within the UNSC/P5+1 setting during March,
tensions were clearly building as the Russian Foreign Ministry publicly denounced Iran’s
mismanagement of the highly contentious issue (Katz, p. 3; Parker, p. 263).
A fundamental turning point in bilateral relations came in late June 2006,
however, when the Iranian president formally rejected a generous settlement from the
EU-3 which, according to Parker, would have provided the IRI with increasing access to
international capital, investment, and markets (Parker, 2008, p. 268-9). Having failed to
concede to the highly generous conditions of the EU-3 negotiations, Russia seems to have
largely abandoned its commitment to continued diplomatic support for the IRI.
Beginning on July 31, 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1696 which called for the
imposition of sanctions if all enrichment activities were not ended within thirty days
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(Katz, 2006, p. 4; Parker, p. 250, 270). Failing to concede to the UNSC’s demands, the
council passed Resolution 1737 in December 2006 which called for the beginning of
international sanctions (Parker, p. 301).
With cooperation on the issue of Caspian delimitation effectively ended and
cooperation in the nuclear sphere collapsing, it was clearly the case that by the end of
2006 bilateral relations were now entering a state of general decline.

2007-2011: State of decline
Average GPA Score for Period: 8.16, Low-Level of Moderate Cooperation
The period of 2007-11 would prove to be one of quickly worsening conditions
between the two nations. The status of bilateral relations had been confirmed early on in
January 2007 when Russian president Vladimir Putin dismissed the Ayatollah
Khamenei’s calls for a new “strategic alliance” in regional affairs (Parker, 2008, p. 302).
While president Vladimir Putin would visit the IRI later that same year in October
2007—the highest ranking visit of a Russian leader to Iran since 1943 (Parker, p. 305)—
relations on all three issues were in a clear state of decline thereby confirming the fact
that the high-level of affinity of the 1990s was now nearly at its end. Putin’s visit to
Tehran had entailed a summit on Caspian affairs as well as a series of meetings with both
president Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei; by Parker’s account
both sets of meetings had proved themselves largely unremarkable (Parker, p. 305). On
the issue of Caspian delimitation, Parker indicates that not only did the summit simply
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‘paraphrase’ previous non-aggression language from earlier bilateral treaties, but more
important still it failed to resolve the essential question of Caspian delimitation (Parker,
p. 305). In a similar fashion Parker notes that calls for long-term economic, industrial,
scientific, and technical cooperation unveiled no new concrete initiatives and “merely
resurrected the negotiations apparently dropped after 2003” (Parker, p. 305).
And although cooperation in Caspian and nuclear affairs had largely collapsed in
recent years, the previous period (2002-06) had been notable for the continuation of the
dyad’s long-standing relationship in the trade of conventional weaponry. While there had
been a marked decline in the number of active contracts in the previous term when
compared to earlier eras, until 2007 the trade in arms continued largely uninterrupted.
And yet between 2007 and 2011 even the trade in conventional weapons would
effectively dry-up thereby leaving a general deficit in all levels of political affinity
between these two nations.
Between 2007 and 2010 Russia would continue to fulfill long-standing contracts
for the delivery of Anti-Tank Missiles (signed in 1991, 1995, and 1998) and turrets for
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (signed in 1999), as well as its more recent agreements for the
Tor-M1 air defense system (signed in 2005) (SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database). While
deliveries on Anti-Tank Missiles and Turrets would continue through 2010, deliveries on
the Tor-M1 were quickly concluded by 2007 (SIPRI). Most importantly of all, this
period was remarkable for the simple fact that only one new conventional arms
agreement had been signed between both nations. The general deficit of both new and
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existing contracts indicate a substantial reduction in the conventional weapons trade, the
likes of which had been unknown since general rapprochement had occurred in the late
1980s (See figure 2 in previous section).
The single new contract agreed to in 2007 was for the $800 million sale and
delivery of Russia’s S-300 long-range air defense missile system (Parker, 2008, p. 309;
Kessler and Richburg, 2010, June 12). According to Parker, the sale of the S-300 was
highly significant insofar as it would provide Iran with the ability to defend its nuclear
installations at Bushehr and Natanz from high-altitude stealth bomber attacks (Parker,
2008, p. 303). According to a UPI report, “The S-300 is considered one of the world’s
most advanced air-defense systems…[And] can engage multiple targets, missiles as well
as aircraft, at ranges of more than 100 miles at low and high altitudes” (UPI, 2011,
August 30). While the announcement of the contract was clearly a significant political
development, further complications related to Iran’s nuclear enrichment program cut
short the delivery of this critical weapons system (Katz, 2010, p. 17).
In particular UNSC Resolution number 1929 (dated June 9, 2010) paragraph 8
explicitly called for expanding international sanctions against Iran to include the “direct
or indirect supply, sale or transfer” of conventional weapons by all nations (United
Nations Bibliographic Information System-UNBISNET). According to the Glen Kessler
and Keith B. Richburg of the Washington Post officials from the Russian Foreign
Ministry had originally suggested—just one day after the vote—that deliveries of the S300 system would not be affected by the new round of sanctions (Kessler & Richburg,
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2010, June 12).

Kessler and Richburg indicate that the Foreign Ministry’s initial

assertion had been based upon the fact that a “loophole in the language of the resolution
suggested that defensive ground-to-air missile systems such as the S-300 were not
covered by the ban” (Kessler & Richburg). Notably, just two days after the event, the
Kremlin contradicted the Foreign Ministry’s statements indicating that the language of
the resolution did, in fact, apply to the sale of the S-300 systems thereby committing the
Russian Federation to upholding the new round of sanctions and suspending delivery of
the S-300 system (Kessler & Richburg).
Kessler and Richburg further suggest that Russia’s policy reversal may have been
contingent upon warming ties between Moscow and Washington insofar as it occurred on
the same day the White House announced a June 24, 2010 summit between presidents
Obama and Medvedev to be held in Washington (Kessler & Richburg, 2010, June 12).
Whatever had been the cause of the collapse of the S-300 deal, it should be recalled that
general cooperation in conventional weapons sales was already in a significant state of
decline by 2010 as evidenced by the dearth of new contracts. Most important is the fact
that throughout this era Moscow appeared both unwilling to continue its prior level of
commitments in weapons cooperation and now appeared simultaneously willing to
endorse a resolution ending arms ties that had extended back to 1989. While it may be
tempting to note that a growing rapprochement with Washington was responsible for this
changing policy, it is prudent to recall that the high-level Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission—itself a longstanding symbol of cooperative relations between Moscow and
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Washington—had been unable to dissuade Russia from collaborative arms contracts with
Iran; such examples tend to suggest an alternate reason for cooperative decline rather
than one based simply upon third party relations with Washington.
More than a year after the Kremlin’s decision to suspend deliveries of the S-300
under sanctions imposed by UNSC Resolution 1929, Iran’s ambassador to Moscow on
August 24, 2011 formally rejected Russia’s official position declaring that S-300
deliveries did not, in fact, violate the terms of the 2010 resolution (UPI, 2011, August
30). Having reportedly made an early down payment of $170 million following the
contract signing in December 2007, Iranian officials became subsequently engaged in a
legal battle to force Russia to abide by its contractual commitments (UPI, 2011).
According to UPI, on June 30, 2011 the IRI filed a lawsuit in the International Court of
Justice seeking to resolve the differing interpretations of the resolution’s provisions and
so win a judgment that would compel Russia to begin system deliveries (UPI, 2011).
Notably, Iran’s legal battle appears to parallel a recent 2011 push by Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to gain domestic approval for Israeli air strikes against
Iranian nuclear facilities (Telegraph, 2011, November 2); as mentioned previously,
numerous sources indicate that the S-300 system would provide Iranian nuclear facilities
with a robust line of defense against air to ground attacks (Parker, 2008, p. 303; UPI,
2011).
Iran’s appeal to an independent court as well as Russia’s continued willingness to
abide by existing international sanctions are, themselves, clear evidence of the widening
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rift in bilateral relations. Still, UPI notes that Moscow’s future position on the issue will
likely depend upon how it views its relations with both Iran and Washington and, citing a
report by Stratfor, suggests that Moscow could, quite easily, subvert international
sanctions if it chose to by channeling S-300 sales through other defense clients such as
Belarus, Armenia, or Kazakhstan (UPI 2011, August 30). Complications pertaining to
the sale and delivery of the S-300 system were not surprising, of course, given the overall
declining state of cooperation that was becoming quickly evident in the nuclear field.
Where Moscow once appeared a robust and cooperative ally in Iran’s quest to develop
nuclear power, leaders in the Kremlin during the period 2007-11 proved also that Russia
held no fundamental allegiance to Iran or to its own history of seemingly unconditional
support. Although nuclear cooperation between the two would appear to regain some of
its former vitality by the fall of 2011, between 2007 and spring of 2011 Russia and Iran’s
relationship would be sorely tested as the international community became increasingly
concerned at Iran’s intentions.
According to United Nations records, between 2007 and 2010 the Russian
Federation would support three more rounds of sanctions against the IRI in the UNSC
forum (Res.1747 March, 2007; Res.1803 March, 2008; Res.1929 June, 2010)
(UNBISNET).

Failing to heed international calls for the suspension of nuclear

enrichment activities, Parker indicates that Russia’s Security Council in March of 2007
notified Iran that it would now make anticipated nuclear fuel deliveries contingent upon
the IRI’s cessation of its enrichment program (Parker, 2008, p. 303). Importantly, Parker
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also indicates that the Kremlin, once again, in the summer of 2007 began to slow down
the completion of the Bushehr facility as a means for increasing its own political leverage
over Tehran. He writes:
Subsequently, after charging Tehran with falling behind on its payments, Moscow
cited technical disruptions in explaining a further delay in the target date for the
completion of Bushehr. When the original contract had been signed in October
1995, Bushehr had been projected to be finished by spring 2000. By summer
2007 Bushehr’s completion date had slipped to fall 2008 at earliest (Parker, p.
303).
Construction delays would continue throughout much of this period as Iran repeatedly
undermined calls by the international community to suspend its enrichment program.
Ongoing project delays would, ultimately, push the completion of the Bushehr project
back to summer of 2010 when both Russian and Iranian officials jointly began loading
fuel rods into the reactor on August 21, 2011—a step which formalized Bushehr’s
classification as an official nuclear facility (Makarova & Kevorkova, 2010, August 20).
During this period the Kremlin sought out other ways of increasing its leverage over a
still-defiant Tehran. While the advertised suspension of S-300 sales in August 2010 was
a clear effort to reign in Tehran’s behavior following expanded UNSC sanctions that
June, the Kremlin also had made use of its leverage against Tehran in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO).
During the 2010 SCO Heads of State meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan (just days
after the expanded 2010 sanctions) Russian president Dmitri Medvedev announced that
no country under UNSC sanctions would be eligible to become a full-member nation of
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the SCO (Kessler & Richburg, 2010, June 12); clearly the announcement had been aimed
at the IRI which presently held ‘observer’ status within the SCO. As if expressing
frustration with the Russian leadership’s earlier decision to suspend S-300 sales, Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was conspicuously absent from the 2010 SCO annual
meeting, traveling instead on an official state visit to Beijing (Kessler & Richburg)—
notably, the presidents of fellow observer nations Pakistan and Afghanistan were, in fact,
in

attendance

at

the

Tashkent

http://eng.kremlin.ru/visits/421).

summit

meeting

(see

Kremlin

website:

Ahmadinejad’s well-timed trip to the PRC would

appear to be an overt symbol of the growing political ill-will between Moscow and
Tehran in this period and may represent Iran’s intention to replace lost Kremlin support
with diplomatic support from Beijing. While political affinity has been a generally rocky
road between Iran and Russia with many ups and downs over the years, Iran’s
relationship with China has generally been more stable, depending upon the long-term
trade in both energy and weaponry (U.S. Energy Information Administration, Iran
country profile; Katzman, 1998, p.3).
Despite the Kremlin’s various efforts to restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions during
this period, Moscow still managed to accommodate the further development of Iran’s
civilian nuclear program by supplying low-enriched uranium to be used as nuclear fuel
for Iran’s Bushehr facility between December 16, 2007 and January 28, 2008 (Parker,
2008, p. 307-8; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2008, January 28). According to
Parker, the decision to ship fuel to Bushehr represented a “clear reversal of long-standing
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policy” wherein Moscow has since 2003 repeatedly tied future fuel deliveries to the
Iran’s voluntary suspension of all enrichment activities and complete adherence to the
IAEA’s additional protocols (Parker, p. 308).

Both Russian and Western officials

(including the UN) have defended the delivery of low-enriched uranium (which cannot be
used for nuclear weapons) indicating that such deliveries, in fact, negate Iran’s need to
continue its own domestic enrichment activities (Parker, p. 308; BBC, 2007, December
17). According to the BBC, although Russia continued to press Iran to suspend its
enrichment program following the fuel delivery agreements, Iranian officials indicated
that Iran “would not halt uranium enrichment under any circumstances” (BBC, 2007).
Thus while the decision to begin fuel deliveries may in some sense be viewed as a
positive bilateral development, Iran’s continued defiance of Moscow’s calls to suspend
enrichment activities also remains a clear indicator of the ongoing tensions which plague
bilateral relations in the nuclear field. Yet by the fall of 2011, the fragile state of nuclear
cooperation that had defined the majority of the era appeared at an end as Russia for the
first time since 2006 indicated that it would now be unlikely to support increasing
sanctions against the IRI.
On November 8, 2011 the IAEA released a new report indicating that the IRI
may, in fact, still be secretly pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon (Gutterman,
2011, November 9). In the wake of the report, officials in both the U.S. and France
signaled that their respective governments would support the imposition of increasing
sanctions against the IRI (both bilateral and multilateral rounds) (Gutterman). According
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to Steve Gutterman of Reuters Russian officials in the Foreign Ministry have rejected the
report’s claims indicating that no new information had been revealed and that Moscow
would therefore not, in fact, support an expanded sanctions regime (Gutterman). Citing
an Interfax report, Gutterman quotes Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov saying
that new sanctions “will be seen in the international community as an instrument for
regime change in Tehran” mentioning further that “That approach is unacceptable to us,
and the Russian side does not intend to consider such proposals” (as cited in Gutterman,
2011, November 9).

The growing nuclear rapprochement was only further

complemented by a joint announcement just two days later on November 11, 2011 that
Russia was considering working with Iran to develop additional nuclear reactors
(Faulconbridge & Gutterman, 2011, November 11). Although no official agreements had
been signed as of the time of this writing, Russia’s increasingly positive public support
for Iran’s nuclear program should be viewed as a both highly significant event following
roughly five years of diminishing affinity.
The time frame of 2007-11 can thus clearly be distinguished as a time of
decreasing political affinity as cooperation over the sale of conventional weapons and
nuclear development stalled and a general consensus on Caspian delimitation was still
absent. And yet, the final months of 2011 appear to suggest that a growing restoration of
cooperative relations may once again be on the rise as both Russia and Iran defend their
nuclear partnership in the face of harsh criticism by the international community.

68

Chapter III
Measuring Bilateral Relations in the Post-Soviet Era:
Constructing a composite dependent variable of General Political Affinity
In an effort to simplify and make usable the complex information pertaining to the
Russian-Iranian political dyad developed in Chapter II, I construct a quantitative, multidimensional indicator of General Political Affinity (GPA) which measures annual
changes in the overall quality of bilateral political relations between 1966 and 2011.
By compressing complex dyadic data into a simple, scaled political indicator this
study seeks to construct a well-informed and sensitive dependent variable which can be
used to test the varying range of factors which can reasonably be expected to influence
changes in bilateral relations. By creating a case-specific indicator, this study hopes not
only to contribute a new and innovative means of measuring Russian-Iranian political
affinity but more generally invites policy professionals to entertain the utility of political
metrics as a means of standardizing the disparate voices of speculation that muddy the
field of international affairs.
In the preceding chapter I sought to demonstrate the idea that ‘General Political
Affinity’ between any set of nations is both highly nuanced and often depends upon a set
of factors that are peculiar to that distinct political relationship. In the case of RussianIranian relations, relying upon a variety of sources, I have suggested that annual political
affinity in the post-Soviet era is the product of changes in the trade of conventional
weapons, cooperation in nuclear development, and agreement in matters of Caspian Sea
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delimitation. Although it is important for the sake of this study to focus on the specific
set of factors comprising Russian-Iranian political relations, we can also inductively
reclassify these specific factors into three substantive issue dimensions which could be
used to develop a definition of General Political Affinity. In this manner I suggest that
General Political Affinity (GPA) is likely the product of: 1) Defense Cooperation; 2)
Inter-State Development Assistance; and 3) General Agreement on Territorial Divisions;
operationalizing these three issue-dimensions would therefore be the task of the
individual researcher/policy professional, a task which, as the preceding chapter has
suggested, is best fulfilled by a comprehensive qualitative analysis of interstate relations.
Although it is reasonable to suggest that underlying factors do not all impact
political affinity in an equal manner, it remains outside the scope of this present study to
determine what varying weights should be assigned to each underlying issue dimension;
such determinations, rather, are best made from a position of consensus involving
multiple case studies. To avoid making excessive errors in the estimation of factor
weights on overall political affinity, I therefore assume that all factors are weighted
equally. As such, the final measurement of GPA is here represented as the sum of all
underlying factors.
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For the sake of efficiency I have chosen to express each of the three underlying
factors or issue dimensions in terms of a simple ordinal, 7-point scale ranging from
‘strong non-cooperation’ (1) to ‘strong cooperation’ (7) with an intermediary point of
neutrality (4).

While expressing each underlying issue dimension as a continuous

variable would provide greater range and variation among scores, the decision to utilize a
ordinal variable is here profitable as it enables the researcher to incorporate a wide
variety of qualitative data into a simple format thereby diminishing one’s reliance upon
traditional numeric indicators which may not always adequately capture the essence of
the issue dimension being analyzed. By translating all three underlying issue dimensions
Category

Numerical Value

into uniform ordinal variables, the product of

Strong Cooperation
Moderate

7
6

General Political Affinity may simply be expressed

Basic Cooperation
Cooperation
Neither Cooperation

5

Basic
NonNor Non-Cooperation
Moderate
NonCooperation

3

4
2

as the sum of all three data points on a 21 point scale.
Table 1: 7-Point Scale for Sub-Components of GPA.

Cooperation

Measuring Defense Cooperation: Annual cooperation in the trade of conventional
weapons (ACTW)
I operationalize Defense Cooperation as annual cooperation in the trade of
conventional weapons, relying upon dyadic trade registers provided by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) ‘Arms Transfer Database.’ SIPRI’s
supplier-recipient trade registers provide information concerning both the years in which
specific conventional arms agreements were initially signed and include also the years
during which deliveries on those agreements were made. In order to describe the quality
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of ongoing cooperation in any given year I focus specifically on the Aggregate Number of
Contracts (ANC) in existence, where the ANC represents the sum of new and open
contracts in a given year.
By focusing on the ANC rather than on data indicating the value of annual sales
or the weapons typology, I anticipate that my indicator will more accurately reflect
changes in the underlying political conditions which constitute the relationship.

In

particular, I expect that a climate of increasingly negative political relations would be
reflected in few or no new contracts being signed as well as a general reduction, slow
down, or cessation of deliveries on existing contracts. Conversely I expect that a positive
political climate would be reflected by newly signed contracts as well as continuous
deliveries of existing contracts.
In order to estimate the scaled level of cooperation indicated by the ANC in any
given year I convert each score to a standard Z score (where z = (x - μ) / σ) and then
assign a corresponding ordinal value based upon the number of standard deviations each
score is above or below the population mean (z-scores are a representation of how many
standard deviations a given score is above or below the population mean).

The

population mean is calculated using the average annual ANC for the years of 1966
through 2010. I have chosen to use the post-World War II period of 1966 to 2010, rather
than a shorter period more closely approximating the years of this study, because this
expanded period is more likely to provide an accurate picture of long-term relations
between Moscow and Tehran and therefore functions to mitigate reliability concerns
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associated with any particular year or set of years. The year 1966, in particular, is chosen
as a starting point because this represents the first year in the post-WWII era in which
Moscow and Tehran had formally entered into cooperative engagement in conventional
weapons sales as indicated by SIPRI records. Table 2 provides the coding scheme for
translating ANC z-scores into the 7-point scale of dyadic cooperation.

Thus, for

example, in order to code a given year with the rating of ‘Strong Cooperation’ the ANC
z-score in a given year would need to be greater than or equal to 1 standard deviation
above the population mean.
Table 2: Coding Scheme for transforming Aggregate Number of Defense Contracts (ANC) into 7point
scale of cooperation.
Level of Cooperation

Coding Scheme

(ANC=Aggregate Number of Contracts)

7

Strong Cooperation

ANC z-score is (> or =) 1.0 Standard Deviations Above Population Mean

6

Moderate Cooperation

ANC z-score is (> or =) 0.5 Standard Deviations Above Population Mean

5

Basic Cooperation

ANC z-score is (> or =) 0.1 Standard Deviations Above Population Mean

4

Median Point

ANC z-score is (< or =) 0.1 Standard Deviations Above or Below the Population Mean

3

Basic Non-Cooperation

ANC z-score is (> or =) 0.1 Standard Deviations Below Population Mean

2

Moderate Non-Cooperation

ANC z-score is (> or =) 0.5 Standard Deviations Below Population Mean

1

Strong Non-Cooperation

ANC z-score is (> or =) 1.0 Standard Deviations Below Population Mean

The value of this coding scheme can clearly be discerned by examining the data
points in graphical format. Figure 3 (below) clearly conforms to the expectation that
Russian-Iranian bilateral political cooperation was either low or non-existent throughout
the 1970s and 1980s as a product of Cold War geopolitical alignments, the 1979 Iranian
revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as the Soviet Union’s stated
support for Iraq throughout the Iran-Iraq war. Similarly, Figure 3 also confirms the
anticipated swelling of bilateral relations that occurred throughout much of the 1990s and
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early 2000s, but also notably recognizes the significant decline in cooperation during
1992 when both nations briefly supported adversarial factions in the Tajik civil war as
well as the general downturn in relations that defines the period following 2006. A
complete list of all annual observations may be found in the Appendix under Table A. 7.
Figure 3: Annual Cooperation in the Trade of Conventional Weapons (1966-2010).

Measuring Inter-State Development Assistance: Annual cooperation in nuclear
development (ACND)

State-sponsored development assistance is here operationalized as annual
cooperation in nuclear development (ACND).

Complicating any effort to measure

ongoing nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran is the fact that Moscow has often
pursued a multi-vectored policy.

While Russia has ultimately satisfied its initial

commitments to the IRI regarding assistance in the development of civilian nuclear
power (i.e.—construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant), the Kremlin and other elites
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have often pursued policies or actions which have simultaneously

supported and

undercut efforts to restrict the proliferation of highly-restricted technologies and
materials essential to the development of a weaponized Iranian nuclear program; further
complicating this scenario is the fact that policies/activities encouraging proliferation and
non-proliferation occur at competing domestic and international levels.
In order to make sense of this often contradictory data I have created a system
which allows me to numerically code each observable instance of cooperation or noncooperation in terms of a 7-point scale. Annual ACND scores are then determined by
taking the average of all observable instances during a given year. Table 3 below
represents the coding scheme used to document each instance of cooperation or noncooperation in nuclear development during a given year. Annual events are principally
derived from Parker (2008), but have also been complemented by observations reported
in Orlov & Vinnikov (2005), Katzman (1998) and the Russian Federal Atomic Energy
Agency. Although Parker does not offer a formal dataset of events pertaining to nuclear
cooperation, his text is richly populated by descriptions of such events as well as the
dates of their occurrence. Extracting event information from the text of Parker and the
above-named supplementary sources, I have created a timeline of pertinent data that can
be coded according to the coding scheme presented in Table 3 below. The event data
used in this study is available upon request.
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Table 3: Coding scheme for nuclear cooperation event data.

7

Level of Cooperation
Strong Cooperation

Conditions/Definitions
Russian Federation provides Iran with critical diplomatic protection in international forums,
i.e.-actively blocking attempts by international community to address proliferation concerns
or impose sanctions regime.

6

Moderate Cooperation

5

Basic Cooperation

4

Tenuous
Cooperation/NonCooperation
Basic Non-Cooperation

Russian Federation establishes domestic policy, directives, legislation which could directly
destabilize Russian Federation’s general commitment to non-proliferation (including
appointment of Ministers associated with proliferation risks).

Can be increased by ½ point if Russia abstains from voting on measures which
could lead to international sanctions
Russian Federation officially committed to aiding Iranian efforts to develop a distinctly
civilian nuclear program

Can be increased by ½ point if high-ranking officials/elites are engaged or can be
reasonably suspected of involvement in activities increasing likelihood of
proliferation of restricted technologies to Iran
Rhetorical or informal indications of cooperation/non-cooperation

3

2

Moderate
Non-Cooperation

1

Strong Non-Cooperation

Russian Federation sponsoring efforts to delay development of Iranian civilian nuclear
program (e.g.-work slow- downs)

Can be decreased by ½ point if high-ranking officials/elites are engaged in
activities decreasing likelihood of proliferation of restricted technologies to Iran.
Russian Federation establishes domestic policy, directives, legislation which could directly
increase control over proliferation (including appointment of ministers associated with nonproliferation activities)

Can be decreased by ½ point if Russia abstains from voting on measures that
could lead to international sanctions.
Russian Federation supports the international community in the imposition of sanctions or
international efforts to control proliferation; Russian Federation takes decisive steps to end
all cooperation in nuclear field (including military action).

The coding scheme represented in Table 3 makes three broad assumptions. In the
first instance, the coding scheme assumes that higher levels of cooperation or noncooperation represent those efforts to either aid or restrict Iran in the development of a
militarized nuclear program. Although Iranian officials have long-insisted that their
government is not actively seeking a weaponized nuclear program, evidence of ongoing
uranium enrichment activities, attempted acquisition of ballistic missile technology, and
recent IAEA reports would suggest otherwise. In light of this, I assume that efforts
aimed to aid the development of a distinctly militarized program represent a moderate
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level of collaboration insofar as they prioritize bilateral cooperation over adherence to
multi-lateral agreements (such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) or international
sanctions. Efforts deemed likely to support the development of a much-less controversial
civilian nuclear program are assigned a lower magnitude cooperation score and are here
represented as instances of basic cooperation. In terms of non-cooperation Russian
efforts to restrict collaboration in Iran’s development of civilian nuclear power is
classified as an instance of basic non-cooperation, while efforts to limit or restrict the
development of a weaponized program are treated as examples of moderate noncooperation.
The second key assumption made by this coding system lies in the fact that it
evaluates instances of cooperation and non-cooperation in international venues such as
the IAEA Board of Governors, the United Nations Security Council, and GoreChernomyrdin Commission as inherently more important than those events occurring
internally (labeled as either strong cooperation or strong non-cooperation). As such,
Russian efforts to block UNSC resolutions seeking to impair Iranian nuclear development
are here represented as inherently more important instances of cooperation than even
those domestic directives or initiatives which lead to concrete proliferation. While the
actual proliferation of restricted technology may occur illegally or as a byproduct of lax
enforcement policies, diplomatic support (or non-support) in key international forums
represents an explicit intention on the part of the state leadership to support Iran in its
quest for both civilian and military nuclear power.
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Conversely, efforts to support

sanctions or public condemnations against Iran in international forums are deemed to be
the highest levels of non-cooperation (strong non-cooperation) insofar as they represent
the intentions of state leaders to side with western nations which have been generally
opposed to Iranian nuclear aspirations. Based upon these criteria, Figure 4 (below)
depicts annual cooperation in nuclear development (ACND) between Russia and Iran for
the years 1985-2011.
Figure 4: Annual Cooperation in Nuclear development (1966-2011).

Measuring General
Agreement on Territorial
Divisions: Cooperation in
Caspian Sea Delimitation
(CCSD)

In this section I
operationalize

‘General

Agreement on Territorial Divisions’ as ‘Cooperation in Caspian Sea Delimitation’
(CCSD). In order to construct a measurement capable of expressing qualitative changes
in bilateral cooperation on Caspian delimitation I begin by identifying 5 possible
delimitation regimes that have been proposed or supported by the littoral nations since
the collapse of the USSR. As discussed in this chapter, treaties signed in 1921 and 1940
between Moscow and Tehran provided the framework for long-standing delimitation
agreement based upon a condominium principle where both the seabed and sea-surface
were owned equally by Russia and Iran excepting a 10-mile sovereign, off-shore zone.
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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 all newly independent nations were
obliged to uphold existing delimitation treaties until a new joint regime could be
established.

Renewed international interest in the Caspian’s abundant hydrocarbon

resources during the 1990s placed pressure on each of the littoral states to quickly
identify a delimitation regime that would maximize their own particular share of
maritime resources—a contingency which thus jeopardized the initial post-Soviet status
quo.

Although Russia and Iran would initially remain jointly committed to a

condominium approach to resource utilization, by 1998 pressures within the Caspian
would lead to the dramatic polarization of Russian-Iranian positions thereby fracturing
the long-standing cooperative relationship. Although no new unanimous regime has yet
been adopted, North Caspian nations today (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan) have
already entered into formal bilateral treaties which are used to justify ongoing exploration
and production (E&P) activities in formal national sectors which are demarcated by a
modified median line (MML).

In contrast, both Iran and Turkmenistan today hold

resolutely to the former Soviet-Iranian treaties emphasizing joint ownership and a
condominium approach to resource extraction—claiming that no E&P activities can be
undertaken until all littoral nations have endorsed a unanimous delimitation regime.
Relying upon Mahmoud Ghafouri (Ghafouri, 2008), I identify 5 possible postSoviet delimitation regimes which can be scaled to represent distance intervals between
Russia and Iran’s preferred policy positions in any given year (see Table 4). Ghafouri’s
research is critical because it not only describes the variety of delimitation positions
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available, but also (informally) prioritizes the delimitation regimes according to each
nation’s preferences—scaling the five delimitation positions I can thus determine the
distance interval between Russia and Iran’s policy position in any given year. Distance
intervals between policy positions during any given year are then compared against a 7point scaled indicator of cooperation to make a final determination regarding the nature
of Cooperation in Caspian Sea Delimitation (CCSD) (See Table 5 at end of section).
Table 4: Scaled Caspian Sea delimitation positions of the five littoral nations.
Notes:

Scaled Caspian Delimitation
Positions
1

2

3

4

5

Condominium approach to Caspian Sea resources
where equal joint utilization of all living and nonliving resources are permitted with exception of 10
mile off-shore national zones
Condominium approach to Caspian Sea resources
where equal joint utilization of all living and nonliving resources (both seabed and sea surface) are
permitted with exception of 45 mile off-shore national
zones.
20% Equal Share Division (ESD) of Caspian Sea
under a unified, legal regime for both seabed and
surface (a modified national sector approach)
Modified Median Line (MML) division of Caspian
Seabed into sovereign national sectors with full state
sovereignty over both seabed and sea surface.
Modified Median Line (MML) division of Caspian
Seabed into sovereign national sectors with joint
usage of sea surface for navigation.

Iran: 1940-1996; 1998-Present
Russia: 1940-1996

Iran: 1996-1998
Russia: 1996-1998

*Iran has advocated for this position but presently
insists that a delimitation regime based upon the
1921/1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties should persist until
a new regime is established.

Russia: 1998-Present

Table 4 (above) presents the five proposed delimitation regimes in a scaled
format where lower places on the scale are reserved for joint ownership positions and a
condominium approach to natural resource development.

As indicated previously a

condominium approach to resource development empowers all littoral nations with
potential veto power over exploration and production activities and so incentivizes joint
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projects including all Caspian members as a way of defusing potential veto scenarios.
Such a regime is thought especially favorable to Iran owing to the fact that hydrocarbon
resource deposits in Iran’s South Caspian location are less prevalent than in the North
Caspian and located at greater depths thus raising the costs of production (Ghafouri,
2008, p. 89). The condominium approach subsequently provides Iran with greater access
to Caspian resources and incentivizes all littoral nations to include Iran in E&P
opportunities despite ongoing international sanctions. Although both Russia and Iran
adhered to position 1 for the greater portion of the 20th century, by 1996 Russia, Iran, and
Turkmenistan had proposed extending the 10 mile offshore zone to a 45 mile offshore
zone (Ghafouri, p.87). Thus the year 1996 is treated as the high point of CCSD owing to
the fact that both nations were diplomatically able to agree upon an alteration to the
existing regime and were simultaneously capable of drumming up support from a
neighboring littoral nation.
The other end of the scale is represented by variations on the modified median
line position which divides up the Caspian Sea into unequal national sectors. Position 4
was initially endorsed by Azerbaijan and provided total state sovereignty over both the
seabed and sea-surface (Ghafouri, p. 87).

By 1998 Russia and Kazakhstan would

informally agree to the national sector approach outlined in position 5 which although
proposing national sovereignty over the seabed, left the sea-surface freely navigable—a
position which Ghafouri notes is likely appealing to Russia because of the fact that it
continues to ensure the free mobility of Russia’s Caspian-based naval fleet across all sea
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waters (Ghafouri, 88-89). Azerbaijan would agree, informally, to the Russian-Kazakh
position in January 2001 and would later sign a trilateral agreement with Russia and
Kazakhstan to divide the North Caspian along these same lines in May of 2003
(Ghafouri, p. 88).
According to Ghafouri, position 5 should be the least palatable position to Iran
because it not only significantly limits the IRI’s ability to access resources outside of its
own diminished national sector (as in the case of both positions 4 and 5) but moreover
provides Iran with no legal buffer from Moscow’s naval presence (Ghafouri, p. 89).
Thus I infer that position 5 would be less favorable to Iran than position 4 where the seasurface is subject to national sovereignty. In response to the adoption of a national sector
approach based upon a modified median line, Iran has suggested position 3 as a way to
increase its share of Caspian maritime territory (Ghafouri, p. 89). Position 3 differs from
the other national sector positions insofar as it proposes to provide each littoral nation
with an equal 20% share of the seabed and sea-surface (Ghafouri, p. 89). While position
3 is a significant improvement over positions 4 and 5—which both would leave Iran with
a diminished 11% share of the Caspian—there is clear reason to suspect that Iran would
nevertheless still prefer joint ownership of the Caspian paired with a condominium
approach to resource development as this would maximize Iran’s ability to participate in
lucrative exploration and production activities (Ghafouri, 89).
Table 5 below displays the coding scheme for the recognized distance intervals
between delimitation positions and thereby establishes the annual level of cooperation in
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Caspian Sea Delimitation (CCSD) on a 7-point ordinal scale. Between 1940 and 1996
Russia and Iran shared the same approach to delimitation (position number 1) with a
distance interval between positions of 0 (where 1-1=0), thereby indicating a Moderate
level of CCSD (level 6). Between 1996 and 1997 both nations moved simultaneously to
adopt delimitation position 2 with a distance interval of 0 (where 2-2=0), gaining
additional support for the new delimitation position from Turkmenistan thereby
indicating a Strong level of cooperation (level 7).

By 1998, however, the Russian

Federation had dramatically altered its policy stance, adopting position 5 in tandem with
Kazakhstan and later Azerbaijan. Moscow’s move subsequently forced Iran to return to a
preference for position 1 which calls for adherence to the delimitation regime outlined in
the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties until such time as all nations can unanimously
agree on a new regime (Ghafouri, p. 89). The distance interval suggested by this change
is therefore set at 4 (5-1=4), indicating the greatest possible level of distance between
established delimitation positions. The fact that Russia has persuaded two other nations
to adopt this rival position further indicates an increasing degree of polarization in policy
positions within the Caspian, a condition which suggests a level of Strong NonCooperation (level 1) since 1998.

83

Table 5: Coding scheme for Cooperation in Caspian Sea delimitation based upon scaled position
differences.
7
6
5
4

Level of Cooperation
Strong Cooperation

3

Moderate Cooperation
Basic Cooperation
Neither Cooperation nor NonCooperation
Basic Non-Cooperation

2
1

Moderate Non-Cooperation
Strong Non-Cooperation

Conditions
Agreement over delimitation (position difference=0) and dyad is capable of persuading
other states to join delimitation regime.
Agreement over delimitation (position difference=0)
General agreement over delimitation (position difference=1)
Differing positions but with room for accommodation (position difference=2)
General disagreement over delimitation (position difference=3) marginal likelihood of
accommodation
Disagreement over delimitation (position difference=4) low likelihood of accommodation
Disagreement over delimitation (position difference=4)—one member of dyad has joined
alternate delimitation regime with other state actors

Figure 5: Annual Cooperation in Caspian Sea delimitation (1966-2010).

The indicator of annual
CCSD scores (Figure 5) quite
clearly represents the narrative
of

Caspian

discussed

cooperation

throughout

this

chapter and further demonstrates
the importance of taking a multi-dimensional approach to measuring political affinity.
Although cooperation in the trade of conventional weapons and nuclear development had
continued roughly until 2006, it is clear that bilateral relations were already subject to a
significant level of strain as early as 1998 when Russia began to adopt an increasingly
adversarial position in matters of Caspian delimitation. Thus while it is fair to say that
the late 1990s and early 2000s may have represented an unprecedented level of defense
and development cooperation between Russia and Iran, it is clearly also the case that
overall affinity was simultaneously being moderated by changes in Caspian geopolitics.
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Such cases remind us that political relations between two nations are not without their
fair share of contradictions and that the quality of relations in any given year is best
represented by a summary of all important political developments. As such we can be
increasingly assured that a multi-dimensional measurement of political affinity—as
presented in the following section—represents our best effort at approximating the
complex reality of Russian-Iranian relations.

Russian Iranian General Political Affinity (GPA): Revealing a dependent variable

Figure 6 (below) represents the annual level of General Political Affinity (GPA)
between Russia and Iran for the years 1966-2011. Annual scores represent the sum of all
three underlying variables (Trade in Conventional Weapons; Nuclear Development; and
Caspian Sea Delimitation) and are expressed in terms of a 21-point scale of cooperation.
The decision to sum all three scores is based upon the desire to express the greatest range
of variance in order to maximize the indicator’s overall utility in cases of analysis and
testing. Score tables for the period of this study 1987-2011 are located in the Appendix
(see Table A. 7) and provide annual data points for each sub-component of GPA. It
should be noted that 2011 data for the Trade in Conventional Weapons (TCW) is not yet
available; in order to account for this missing period of data, I simply apply the 2010
TCW score to year 2011.
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It will be noted that the summed indicator of GPA presented in Figure 6 closely
corresponds to the historical discussion presented during Chapter II. The measurement of
GPA presented here not only confirms that bilateral relations between both nations had
reached their highest point during the 1990s but it also clearly demonstrates how such
cooperation began to progressively diminish starting in the late 1990s. The close degree
of correspondence to the preceding discussion should serve to increase efficacy in this
indicator’s sub-components as well as in the model’s overall utility.
In terms of this model’s advantages, GPA’s 21-point scale not only enables
researchers to differentiate between three broad categories of cooperation (high,
moderate, and low), but more specifically it can be used to illustrate minor fluctuations
operating within each category or period of time. Thus while the depiction of GPA here
clearly mirrors the broad changes in cooperation highlighted in the preceding discussion,
it also recreates the turbulence that has defined Russian-Iranian cooperation on a year by
year basis. In this capacity, GPA proves itself an essential tool for representing the
ongoing ‘crisis’ of cooperation that has come to define bilateral relations in the postSoviet era
In more generic terms, Figure 6 reminds us that while moderate levels of
cooperation between Moscow and Tehran may tend to predominate, the potential to
broaden cooperation is also invariably inherent. If periods of moderate-cooperation serve
to remind us of an abiding mixed utility for ongoing relations, periods of strongcooperation (as evident during the 1990s) also suggest that this unique political dyad
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maintains the ability to overcome its mutual apprehensions and to deepen political
collusion when necessary.
Figure 6: Russian-Iranian General Political Affinity 1966-2011.

Evaluating the Utility of General Political Affinity
While the indicator of General Political Affinity (GPA) is well-grounded in the
tradition of literature detailing Russian-Iranian relations, there are simple steps that can
be taken still in order to improve overall efficacy in it, and to dispel uncertainties about
its viability as an indicator of bilateral political affinity.

In this section I focus

specifically upon resolving two key issues with GPA.
In the first instance, I evaluate whether or not GPA should reasonably be
comprised solely of political sub-components or whether it should also include some
component of economic data. Testing the data, I determine that an additional economic
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sub-component would not greatly improve the explanatory power of GPA and so
determine to preserve GPA as it has been presented during this chapter. In the second
instance I evaluate whether or not GPA does, in fact, measure what it specifically
purports to, i.e.—bilateral political affinity of Moscow and Tehran. Testing GPA for
both discriminant and convergent validity, I determine that GPA is, in fact, a strong
predictor of bilateral political affinity between Moscow and Tehran.

Test 1: Evaluating the Utility of Adding an Economic Sub-Component
In this section I seek to evaluate whether or not GPA could be greatly improved
by adding an economic sub-component to its underlying set of politically-oriented
variables.

While principle component analysis may be used to determine those

underlying factors which should reasonably be included in a composite variable, the low
number of observations precludes any robust statistical analysis, and encourages me to
evaluate the utility of its sub-components using an alternate methodology.
By correlating GPA with an overtly economic variable it is possible to determine
whether or not bilateral relations are substantively premised upon economic concerns. In
the event that GPA correlates highly with the economic data it would be natural to
assume that economic considerations are a principle part of the dyad’s ongoing
interactions with one another, and that any measure of GPA should include some
attention to economic data. In the event that GPA does not strongly correlate with the
economic variable, it would be alternately safe to conclude that bilateral relations are
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predominantly grounded in overtly political considerations, and that the sub-components
of GPA—as presented in this chapter—should remain unchanged.
In order to measure the changing utility of the dyad’s economic partnership to
both Russia and Iran (EU), I express the value of each nation’s exports to the other as a
percentage of all of its global exports during a given year. The utility of the economic
partnership for each nation is therefore represented as:
EU=[(Ex_nation/Ex_world) *100]
Where EU=economic utility of partnership to a given nation; Ex_nation=the value of
exports to the partner nation during a given year; and Ex_world=the value of all national
exports during a given year.
Data for these variables is derived from the International Monetary Fund’s
“Direction of Trade Statistics” database which includes constant export data for the years
1985-2011 for the USSR/Russia, and 1988-2011 for Iran. Data between 1985 and 1991
corresponds to exports between the U.S.S.R. and Iran, while data between 1992 and 2011
corresponds to exports between the Russian Federation and Iran. Annual data for the
both nation’s economic utility for partnership can be found in the Appendix Tables A. 2
and A. 3.
In order to determine whether or not there is any meaningful level of association
between GPA and both Russia and Iran’s economic utility for partnership (EU) I utilize
the Spearman’s Rank Correlation method. The Spearman’s method proves useful here
because unlike the more-traditional Pearson’s method, it does not require both variables
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to be normally distributed; in particular, the variable of GPA is not normally distributed
and so violates one of the fundamental conditions of the Pearson’s approach. I define an
association between variables as ‘significant’ whenever the correlation coefficient is both
greater than +/- 0.4, and where the corresponding p-value is less than 0.05.
Variable

rho coefficient

2-tailed p-value

Significance

EU_USSR/Russian Federation

-0.3444

0.07856

P> 0.05

EU_Iran

0.1198

0.57713

P>0.05

Table 6. Correlation matrix for analysis of GPA and Economic Utility for Partnership. Calculations
performed online using: Wessa P., (2012), Spearman Rank Correlation (v1.0.1) in Free Statistics
Software
(v1.1.23-r7),
Office
for
Research
Development
and
Education,
URL
http://www.wessa.net/rwasp_spearman.wasp/

Results presented in Table 6 (above) clearly indicate that GPA is not significantly
associated with either nation’s economic utility for partnership (EU). In both cases the
correlation coefficient for both variables is below the threshold of +/-0.4 and the value of
p is greater than .05. Based upon these findings I can conclude that political relations
between Moscow and Tehran (as presented in GPA) are not likely to be a function of
either nation’s expected utility for economic partnership and so conclude that relations
may adequately be represented by the distinctly political sub-components of GPA.

Test 2: Testing for Discriminant and Convergent Validity of GPA
In this section I seek to evaluate whether or not GPA can reasonably be found to
measure the concept of bilateral political affinity between Moscow and Tehran which it
purports to. Successfully testing for both discriminant and convergent validity enables
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this study to reasonably claim: 1) that GPA is not measuring some other concept besides
bilateral political affinity; and 2) that GPA is an accurate, yet unique, measurement of
bilateral political affinity. Taken together this round of tests should substantially increase
overall efficacy in GPA’s ability to meaningfully depict bilateral political affinity
between Moscow and Tehran.

Test of Discriminant Validity
In order to determine whether or not GPA may be measuring some concept other
than bilateral political affinity I have formulated two alternate concepts which GPA could
be claimed to represent. With the Islamic Republic of Iran listed by the IMF as an
“emerging & developing economy,” it is possible to assume that changes in GPA do not
reflect merely bilateral political relations but rather that they represent the broadly
changing quality of USSR/Russian relations to all countries of this same socio-political
and economic class—what might be referred to alternately as the Global South. In this
manner, periods of intense cooperation represented by GPA could be taken to indicate a
growing policy convergence between Moscow and the world’s less developed countries.
Alternately, periods of diminished cooperation may represent a move away from the
Global South towards a state of heightened relations with the world’s advanced
economies, i.e.-the Global North.
In order to determine whether or not this may, in fact, be the case, I correlate GPA
with an indicator representing Russia’s relations to the Global South (RUS_GS). To
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operationalize this concept I simply estimate the annual percentage value of the
USSR/Russian Federation global exports that are derived from trade with economies of
the Global South. Russia’s relations to the Global South may therefore be represented as:
RUS_GS=[Ex_GS/Ex_world)*100]
Where RUS_GS=Russian relations to the Global South; Ex_GS=Value of Russian
exports to the Global South (IMF’s ‘emerging & developing economies’); and
Ex_world=the value of all Russian global exports during a given year.
Data for this indicator is derived from the International Monetary Fund’s
“Direction of Trade Statistics” database, which provides uninterrupted export data
between the USSR/Russia and all countries classified as Emerging and Developing
Economies for the years 1981-2011. As in the previous round of testing, data prior to
1992 is culled from USSR export statistics and data post-1992 is taken from Russian
Federation figures. Data for RUS_GS may be found in the Appendix, Figure A. 4.
In the second instance, I determine to ask the question of whether or not GPA
may, in fact, be simply mirroring the coverage of media reports dedicated to the
discussion of bilateral relations rather than the subtleties of actual bilateral political
relations. Insofar as GPA’s origins lie firmly in existing literature on the discussion of
bilateral relations, and more importantly because the data sources for each of the
individual sub-components of GPA are highly likely to have been based in media
reporting, it is possible to assume that GPA is simply a reflection of media coverage and
not bilateral political affinity. Data for MC, may be found in the Appendix, Table A. 5.
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To evaluate whether or not GPA is, in fact, a reflection of media coverage (MC), I
correlate GPA with an indicator which represents the number of published articles
directly discussing Russian-Iranian relations (MC). To locate this data, I have performed
a search of ‘Major World Publications’ listed in Lexis Nexus for any articles which
reference Russian-Iranian relations in their headline between January 1st and December
31st of each calendar year between 1979 and 2011 (there are no entries prior to 1979).
The specific search term for this query is: HEADLINE (Russia and Iran) AND relations.
The methodology used for this round of testing mirrors the regime established in
the previous section, relying upon the Spearman’s Rank Order of correlation. As Table
7 (below) clearly demonstrates, neither variable correlates significantly with GPA. In
both cases, RUS_GS and MC fail to correlate with GPA at a level above +/- 0.4 and both
fail to produce p-values lower than .05. These results provide direct confirmation that
GPA is not likely to be measuring some alternate concept; given this data, I therefore
conclude that GPA is more likely to be measuring specifically what it purports to—
bilateral political affinity between both Moscow and Tehran.
Variable

rho coefficient

2-tailed p-value

Significance

RUS_GS

0.008091478

0.965541544

P>0.05

MC

-0.017321356

0.923779542

P>0.05

Table 7: Correlation matrix for test of discriminant validity. Calculations performed online using:
Wessa P., (2012), Spearman Rank Correlation (v1.0.1) in Free Statistics Software (v1.1.23-r7), Office
for Research Development and Education, URL http://www.wessa.net/rwasp_spearman.wasp/
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Test of Convergent Validity
Any test for discriminant validity must, however, be a supplemented by a
simultaneous effort to demonstrate that GPA is, in fact, generally functioning as a solid
indicator of bilateral political affinity in a direct manner. In a test for convergent validity,
the researcher is tasked with locating an alternate variable that could also be claimed to
directly represent the concept being measured, in this case bilateral political affinity. In
those instances where a strong positive correlation between the two variables can be
obtained, it can be assumed that the target variable is, in fact, accurately representing the
concept in question. If, however, correlation is found to be insignificant, then it may
conversely be assumed that the target indicator is unlikely to be a good predictor of the
concept in question; thus both tests of discriminant and convergent validity work together
to demonstrate the likelihood that the target indicator models what it purports to.
In this section I attempt to determine whether there is any meaningful correlation
between GPA and the similarity of Russian-Iranian security alliance portfolios. The
usage of security alliance portfolios to measure the affinity of governments dates back to
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s (1975) introduction of the Tau-b measurement of alliance
portfolio similarity. This indicator was subsequently employed by Organski & Kugler
(1980) and Kim (1991) in Power Transition research as a means for evaluating the likely
affinity between individual governments and the state leader of the international system.
In 1999 Signorino & Ritter presented what they describe as an improved method for
evaluating the similarity of alliance portfolios. Known widely as the S-calculation of
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alliance portfolio data, this measurement has become the sine qua non for measuring this
relationship and has been made popularly available by Bennett & Stam’s Expected Utility
and Data Management Program (EUGene). EUGene alliance portfolio data is derived
from the Correlates of War (COW) version 3.0 alliance dataset which was made
available in 2002.
As in previous sections, I correlate GPA with S utilizing the Spearman’s method,
relying upon the same criteria previously established for determining significance. Data
for S has been culled from EUGene for the years 1966 to 2000; EUGene does not provide
alliance portfolio data for years after 2000. The specific calculation of alliance portfolio
data utilized in this series of tests represents regional, weighted data—wherein state
alliance portfolios are limited to states within “the relevant region for the dyad” and
where S scores are further weighted by taking into account state capabilities data obtained
from the Correlates of War CINC dataset (Bennett & Stam, 2007, p. 38). Data for S may
be found in Appendix, Table A. 6.
Variable

rho coefficient

2-tailed p-value

Significance

S-Calculation of Alliance Portfolio
Similarity

0.410988921

0.014182619

P<0.05

Table 8: Correlation matrix for test of convergent validity. Calculations performed online using:
Wessa P., (2012), Spearman Rank Correlation (v1.0.1) in Free Statistics Software (v1.1.23-r7), Office
for Research Development and Education, URL http://www.wessa.net/rwasp_spearman.wasp/

Table 8 (above) demonstrates clearly that the correlation between GPA and S is
significant and in the expected direction. With a correlation coefficient above 0.4 and
p<0.05, we can safely assume that GPA does, in fact, provide an expedient measurement
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of bilateral political affinity.

Equally important is the finding that correspondence

between both variables is not overly robust. In the event that both variables correlated
perfectly with one another, we would be required to accept the premise that S—as an
existing measure of political affinity—was equally well tasked for evaluating the relation
of governments thereby calling into question the necessity of an alternate methodology as
has been presented by GPA.

In contrast, the lower—yet significant—level of

correspondence clearly demonstrates that GPA is measuring bilateral political affinity
and that it also stands as a unique alternative means of measuring relations between
Moscow & Tehran.

Given this indicator’s strong foundation in literary traditions

detailing Russian-Iranian relations, there is every reason to suspect that GPA likely
outperforms the generic indicator of S in accurately modeling Russian-Iranian relations.
In consideration of the above testing regime, I find that GPA maintains a high
degree of utility for adequately representing Russian-Iranian bilateral political relations.
In the first instance it is apparent that the three distinctly political sub-components should
not be further augmented by the addition of an economic variable. As demonstrated,
political cooperation is not significantly associated with either nation’s estimation of the
value of economic partnership; in other words, partnership of these two nations does not
depend upon perceptions of overall economic utility. In the second instance, validity
testing indicates that GPA is neither reflective of some concept other than bilateral
political affinity, and that it can reasonably serve as an unprecedented model of the status
of political relations at any given time. In light of these findings, this study offers GPA
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as an innovative and accurate means for monitoring changes in Russian-Iranian political
relations over time.

97

Chapter IV
Conclusion

Introduction
In the Crisis of Cooperation, I have attempted to critically evaluate one of the
most prominent and controversial political relationships of the post-Cold War era.
Although relations between Moscow and Tehran had often been highly adversarial during
the 19th and 20th centuries, high levels of cooperation exhibited in the early post-Cold
War era have forced scholars, and policy-makers alike, to re-evaluate the nature of this
bilateral relationship, causing them, in turn, to examine those myriad factors deemed to
be principal to cooperation. But the dearth of critical scholarship on the subject of
Russian-Iranian relations has not helped us to confidently answer some of our most basic
questions about the nature of this relationship or where, in fact, the partnership might be
headed in the coming years. Rather than subjecting this political partnership to empirical
analysis, speculation and historical recitation have, to date, only further muddied the
waters of political inquiry. By redirecting the analysis of Russian-Iranian relations into a
science-based forum, this study has attempted to aggregate, explain, and empirically
evaluate those factors deemed pertinent to bilateral cooperation.
By translating complex historical interactions into a user-friendly dependent
variable referred to as General Political Affinity, this study has sought to bring increasing
clarity and consensus to the study of Moscow & Tehran’s political partnership in a
manner that is unprecedented in the existing literary tradition. The measured expression
98

of political affinity along a 21-point scale has not only created a new platform for
meaningful dialogue among students of Russian-Iranian relations but, perhaps more
importantly, it also paves the way for future empirical research into those factors and
forces that may be responsible for driving changes in cooperation between Moscow and
Tehran over time.
While establishing an effective dependent variable is essential to progress in
empirical research, it is only the first of many hurdles to be attempted in order to truly
understand the complex nature of political relations in this most-important partnership.
Developing a complete understanding of the perennial factors and forces that drive
changes in cooperation will require scholars and analysts alike to revisit the considerable
scope of literature on the subject in order to develop empirically falsifiable hypotheses
about what factors are, and are not, salient to cooperation. By redirecting the record of
literary discussion away from speculative, individual accounts into a science-based
dialogue, not only will we be empowered to make articulate and defensible claims about
the nature of relations, but so too will those claims ultimately enhance our understanding
of international affairs.
In some manner this process has already begun. By evaluating GPA as a function
of three substantive underlying issue dimensions (trade in conventional weapons,
cooperation in nuclear development, and the status of agreement on Caspian Sea
delimitation) this has suggested that bilateral relations are, generically or universally, a
function of three perennial factors: cooperation in matters of defense; state-sponsored
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development assistance; and territorial agreement. While such abstractions are ultimately
only a hypothesis about the ingredients of political affinity, such a hypothesis functions
as a primer for understanding political relationships across the globe that can be tested
and evaluated by the community of scholars and policy professionals. Thus while this
study has taken explicit steps to critically define the nature of Russian-Iranian relations,
one of its most important contributions lies in its development of an efficient blueprint for
understanding political partnerships between nations everywhere.

In this manner,

subsequent investigations into the factors and forces deemed responsible for driving
changes in Russian-Iranian affinity will only further contribute to our generic
understanding of what motivates international outcomes.

Such information remains

important not only for the discipline of political science, but so also for the community of
policy professionals which are equally committed to explaining and predicting
international outcomes.
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Appendix
Table A. 1: Gazprom shareholding controlled by the Russian Federation.
Source: Gazprom corporate website.

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Gazprom shareholding
controlled by the
Russian Federation
40.87
40.87
38.37
38.37
38.37
38.37
38.37
38.37
38.37
50.002
50.002
50.002

Table A. 2: Economic Utility of Bilateral Partnership with Iran to USSR/Russia (1985-2011). Economic
utility is represented as the percentage value of Russian global exports that are derived from trade with
Iran. Source: International Monetary Fund¸ “Direction of Trade Statistics” database.
Year

% Value of
USSR/Russian Global
Exports Derived from
Trade with Iran

Year

%

1985
1986

0.238988172
0.196697
0.196696898
0.385178

1998
1999

0.696824
0.58357

2000
2001

0.613808
1.08916

2002
2003

0.715038
1.00979

2004
2005
2006

1.151643
0.816713
0.656934

2007
2008

0.847255
0.727689

2009
2010
2011

1.178241
1.045429
0.803921

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

0.402469
0.385178052
0.362264
0.604494
0.402469258
0.808358
0.648988
0.362264099
2.306168
0.604493862
0.234419
0.329113
0.808357929
0.452622
0.54927
0.648988452
2.306168225
0.234418662
0.329113221
0.452622012
0.549269752
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Table A. 3: Economic Utility of Bilateral Partnership with USSR/Russia to Iran (1988-2011). Economic
utility is represented as the percentage value of Iranian global exports that are derived from trade with
USSR/Russia. Source: International Monetary Fund¸ “Direction of Trade Statistics” database.

1988
1989

% Value of Iranian
Global Exports Derived
from Trade with
USSR/Russia
1.021415754
0.193612486

1990
1991
1992

0.641163732
1.773408229
0.800496503

1993
1994

0.223903959
0.403538977

1995
1996
1997

0.323611999
0.253829503
1.40814131

1998
1999

0.94084998
0.534846668

2000
2001

0.214507155
0.158387038

Year

Year

%

2002
2003
0.257071
2004
073
2005

0.257071073
0.218931901

2006
2003
2007
2008
0.218931
2009
901
2010
2011
2004
2003
0.307191
2004
663
2005
2006
2005

0.307191663
0.287219678
0.345831759
0.431413911
0.371223429
0.317029513
0.304504634
0.290847088
0.257071073
0.218931901
0.307191663
0.287219678

0.287219
678
2006
0.345831
759
2007
0.431413
911
2008
0.371223
429
2009
0.317029
513
2010
0.304504
634
2011
0.290847
088
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Table A. 4: Percentage Value of USSR/Russian Global Exports to Countries of the Global South (19812011). Source: International Monetary Fund¸ “Direction of Trade Statistics” database.
Year

%

1981
1982
1983

% Value of Russian
Global Exports Destined
to Countries of the
Global South
42.768
36.233
37.595

1996
1997
1998

41.717
44.962
44.772

1984
1985

41.940
40.099

1999
2000

42.139
39.979

1986
1987

44.426
40.961

2001
2002

38.338
41.436

1988
1989
1990

39.735
38.767
37.071

2003
2004
2005

42.852
39.282
40.321

1991
1992

34.761
37.242

2006
2007

38.737
42.211

1993
1994
1995

30.694
40.674
42.364

2008
2009
2010

42.989
41.082
37.368

2011

41.363

Year
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Table A. 5: Media Articles Describing Russian-Iranian Relations (1979-2011). Source: Lexis Nexus;
articles derived from search of ‘Major World Publications’ using search terms [HEADLINE (Russia and
Iran) AND relations].
Year

1979

Number of Media
Articles Describing
Russian-Iranian
Relations
15

1996

45

1980
1981

18
3

1997
1998

53
96

1982
1983
1984

18
5
8

1999
2000
2001

93
107
246

1985
1986

8
10

2002
2003

239
146

1987
1988

17
10

2004
2005

104
165

1989
1990
1991

29
17
16

2006
2007
2008

401
177
169

1992
1993

15
3

2009
2010

231
294

1994
1995

12
94

2011

167

Year
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Table A. 6: Similarity of Russian-Iranian Security Alliance Portfolios (1966-2000). Source: EUGene
version 3.204; Bennett and Stam (2000); Signorino & Ritter (1998). EUGene calculates the S statistic on
the basis of a weighted, regional measure of similarity using data derived from the following Correlates
of War data sets: “Formal Alliances” (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004; Gibler, 2009; Singer & Small, 1966; Small
& Singer, 1969); and “National Material Capabilities” (Singer, Bremmer, & Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987)
datasets.
Year

1966
1967
1968

S-coefficient for
Similarity of
Security Alliance
Portfolios
-0.001711
-0.003498
-0.014991

1983
1984
1985

0.174967
0.177931
0.165975

1969
1970

-0.017957
-0.031966

1986
1987

0.175111
0.17906

1971
1972
1973

-0.048841
-0.052667
-0.043322

1988
1989
1990

0.181775
0.302991
-0.29645

1974
1975

-0.050521
-0.078951

1991
1992

-0.33349
0.561958

1976
1977

-0.077203
-0.063871

1993
1994

0.599405
0.548558

1978
1979
1980

-0.055053
-0.038507
0.204075

1995
1996
1997

0.55328
0.570579
0.580171

1981
1982

0.204674
0.173759

1998
1999

0.606536
0.605353

2000

0.348362

Year

S-coefficient
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Table A. 7: Annual scores for sub-components of General Political Affinity and 5 year period averages
utilized in Chapter II.

1987-91
Trade in Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Development
Caspian Sea Delimitation
General Political Affinity Score
Period Average 87-91

1992-96
Trade in Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Development
Caspian Sea Delimitation
General Political Affinity Score
Period Average 92-96

1997-01
Trade in Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Development
Caspian Sea Delimitation
General Political Affinity Score
Period Average 97-01

2002-06
Trade in Conventional Weapons
Nuclear Development
Caspian Sea Delimitation
General Political Affinity Score
Period Average 02-06

2007-11
T ra d e in C o n v e n t io n a l We a p o n s
N u c le a r D e v e lo p m e n t
C a s p ia n S e a D e lim it a t io n
G e n e ra l P o lit ic a l A f f in it y S c o re
P e rio d A v e ra g e 0 7 - 11

1987
2
1
6
9
13.6

1988
2
1
6
9

1989
7
4
6
17

1990
6
4
6
16

1991
7
4
6
17

1992
2
5
6
13
15.625

1993
7
3
6
16

1994
5
5
6
16

1995
6
3.625
6
15.625

1996
6
4.5
7
17.5

1997
6
4.5
7
17.5
14.475

1998
7
4.5
2
13.5

1999
7
5.75
2
14.75

2000
7
5.125
2
14.125

2001
7
3.5
2
12.5

2002
7
3.5
2
12.5
11.59

2003
7
2.75
2
11.75

2004
4
3
2
9

2005
6
4.1
2
12.1

2006
7
3.6
2
12.6

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

6

4

4

1

1

2.75

2.75

2.75

2.75

3.8

2

2

2

2

2

10.75

8.75

8.75

5.75

6.8

8.16
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